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DEFYING GRAVITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
STANDARDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ATROCITY
CRIMES
Matthew H. Charity*
INTRODUCTION

The International Criminal Court ("ICC") is now entering its second
decade of existence. 1 As a young institution, the ICC is still in the process
of setting norms as to its own scope and jurisdiction. Thus far, one of the
key jurisdictional questions that has defied resolution is the place of
complementarity in deciding whether certain criminal issues of international
concern should be tried before the ICC or national tribunals? Although the
Rome Statute crystallizes definitions of core international crimes that may
be tried before the ICC, the process of determining whether to leave
jurisdiction with the nation or allow jurisdiction to lie with the ICC
continues to lack structure and appropriate guidance.
In the midst of this norm-creating and norm-setting moment in the
codification of international criminal law, the ICC has, at times, set an
overly high bar for the hearing of international criminal law cases. In doing
so, the ICC may not only be forgoing the opportunity to prosecute alleged

* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. J.D.
Columbia Law School, 1999. A.B. Princeton University, 1996. I wish to thank Kim
Chanbonpin, Sudha Setty, Charles Jalloh, as well as the participants of the 2011 Northeast
People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, where I presented an earlier draft of this
paper, for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to my research assistants,
Melissa Lussier and Katherine Tonkovich, and our research librarian Renee Rastorfer, for
their work. Unless otherwise noted, translations from the French (and concomitant errors)
are my own.
1. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July; 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (entered into force on July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/rome_statute%28e%29.pdf.
2. The drafters of the ICC made the requirement that the ICC complement states'
domestic jurisdictions a central component of its authority. See Rome Statute, supra note 1,
pmbl. '1] 10 ("Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this
Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.") & art. 1 ("It shall be a
permanent institution and ... shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.").
Pmbl '1] 6 of the Rome Statute also recalls "that it is the duty of every State to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes." See also JANN K.
KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE RoME STATUTE AND NATIONAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTIONS 4 (2008) (noting that the ICC "is supposed to function as a permanent reserve
court, which steps in when effective national suppression of ICC crimes is absent" (internal
quotes omitted)).
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war criminals, but is also setting an example for States Parties to avoid
domestic prosecutions. This is not a new phenomenon; the question of what
standard for prosecution should be set by the international community has
arisen repeatedly over the past century and again in recent years, and it is a
fly in the ointment of international criminal justice.
4
Different and conflicting approaches have already been voiced,
lending urgency to the project of clarifying complementarity during this
norm-setting phase in the work of the ICC. This Article recommends a new
normative complementary framework for application of core crimes in
national jurisdictions-a necessary step in order to strengthen the ICC's
ability to act as an effective body in punishing war criminals, improving
accountability of governments complicit in atrocity crimes, and deterring
future atrocities.
Emblematic ofthis problem is the case of Bosco Ntaganda, a third-incommand of the Congolese rebel group Forces Patriotiques pour la
Liberation du Congo (FPLC). 5 The Office of the Prosecutor for the ICC6
had alleged that Ntaganda engaged in the war crime of conscription of child
soldiers, in addition to crimes against humanity and other crimes. 7 The Pre-

3. For a list of current States Parties, those sovereign States that have ratified or
acceded to the Rome Statute, see The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CoURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%
20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited May 12, 2013).
4. See generally William A. Schabas, Victor's Justice: Selecting "Situations" at the
International Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 535, 538 (2010) (discussing
limitations on ICC jurisdiction as a reserve court).
5. See infra Part I. C.
(). See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 42(1) (establishing the Office of the Prosecutor
and its mandate to "act independently as a separate organ of the Court. It shall be responsible
for receiving referrals and any substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court, for examining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions before the
Court").
7. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application for Warrants of Arrest, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ~~ 25, 34, 40 (Feb. 10,
2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc530350.pdf [hereinafter PTC I
Warrants Decision] (noting that domestic courts were to some extent dealing with other
allegations with regard to Ntaganda). It should be noted that Ntaganda was twice offered a
role within the Congolese Army- first in January 2005 (see D.R. Congo: Army Should Not
Appoint War Criminals, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 14, 2005), http://www.hrw.org/
news/2005/0 1/13/dr-congo-army-should-not-appoint-war-criminals), and then again in 2009
(see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "You WILL BE PUNISHED": ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS IN EASTERN
CONGO
129
(2009),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
drcl209webwcover2.pdf). Ntaganda again left the army in April 2012 (see D.R. Congo:
Bosco Ntaganda Recruits Children by Force, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 16, 2012),
http://www .hrw.org/news/20 12/05/15/dr-congo-bosco-ntaganda-recruits-children-force), and
has for some months been absent from public scrutiny (see David Smith, Hunting the
Terminator: Congo Continues Search for Bosco Ntaganda, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 28, 2012),
http://www.guardian.co.uk!world/20 12/nov/28/terminator-search-bosco-ntaganda-congo).
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Trial Chamber of the ICC recognized that the Democratic Republic of
Congo was unwilling or unable to prosecute Ntaganda for the alleged war
crimes, 8 leaving criminal accountability for those crimes to the mechanisms
of international criminal justice. However, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber-a
chamber within the ICC with the responsibility for threshold jurisdictional
questions-acting without sufficient guidance, opined that the ICC was
simply not the appropriate venue to try individuals such as Ntaganda. 9 Had
the Pre-Trial Chamber's opinion stood, it would have legitimized the
impunity of Ntaganda and cemented the precedent of a narrow jurisdiction
at the ICC, and that would enable the impunity of others like Ntaganda. 10
Had that occurred, it would have indicated a lost opportunity for the ICC,
nations interested in prosecuting war crimes, and the international
community as a whole. This Article seeks, in part, to enable discourse on
how to broaden ICC's jurisdiction through means at both the domestic and
internationallevels. 11
Part I analyzes the problem of the current trajectory of the ICC with
regard to its jurisdictional scope. Looking at the development of
transnational and international responses to atrocity crimes, including its
burst of development in the last twenty-five years, this article recognizes
that the Rome Statute was drafted with the intention of covering a broader
range of cases than the ICC is currently handling. The intended scope
includes the prosecution of alleged war criminals who were at senior, midlevel, and lower levels of authority in committing grave crimes. However,
the potential scope of the ICC to reach such actors has been progressively
narrowed since the inception of the Rome Statute due to prosecutorial
discretion and resource constraints at the international level. This problem
is exemplified by the 2006 Pre-Trial Chamber decision not to issue a
warrant of arrest for Bosco Ntaganda, a high-ranking alleged war criminal
in the Democratic Republic of Congo; this is rectified, in part, by the ICC
Appeal Chamber's review of that decision. Part I also addresses how
national courts have failed to live up to their international obligations in not
defining gravity 12 broadly so as to encourage the ICC to find that the

8. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, '1!40.
9. Id. '1!89.
10. See infra notes 65-70 for the Appeals' response.
11. The matter of Bosco Ntaganda' s case at the ICC is discussed in more detail infra in
Part I. C.
12. While the terms "grave" and "gravity" were used often throughout the twentieth
century in the context of describing the harms that the international community sought to
prevent, the terms did not require precision until their use created a jurisdictional trigger for
the International Criminal Tribunals. See Margaret M. deGuzman, How Serious Are
International Crimes? The Gravity Problem in International Criminal Law, 51 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 18, 21-22 (2012) (arguing that although there is common understanding that
a gravity standard has been met in cases of mass atrocities such as those in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia, the definition of gravity has not yet been properly established).
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prosecution ofNtaganda and others who are similarly situated are within its
jurisdiction.
Part II considers the historical context of international criminal justice
in two respects. First, it reviews efforts at establishing extra-national
criminal justice mechanisms and notes that, historically, effective
development of transnational legal processes has depended on nations
engaging in norm-setting dialogue that has strengthened and underpinned
international criminal justice mechanisms by giving meaning to the
definitions used by international tribunals and the scope of those tribunals'
work. Second, it argues that the jurisdictional narrowing currently occurring
at the ICC is not a new phenomenon, but instead, it reflects a historical
pattern of the international community attempting to define the jurisdiction
of international criminal processes broadly, only to see those processes
narrowed and limited over time. As such, the current narrowing of
jurisdiction puts the ICC at the brink of lost opportunity to make permanent
an institution that can be truly effective in prosecuting and deterring atrocity
cnmes.
Part III analyzes the slow process and the confusion in the
development of the law divided by the roles of the Office of the Prosecutor,
the Pre-Trial Chamber, and the Appeals Chamber. The Article suggests
further development at the domestic level in order to set broader
jurisdictional norms for the ICC, which the ICC would then be permitted
under the Rome Statute to consider. 13
This Article concludes by suggesting a new normative framework to
ensure that the ICC can defy historical patterns and live up to its potential.
In particular, this Article recommends that States Parties to the Rome
Statute engage further in transnational legal processes with regard to the
question of complementarity. By engaging in interaction, debate, and
discourse, States Parties can enable a broader understanding of what
constitutes gravity within national courts, thereby engaging in positive
norm-setting that resonates with the ICC as it continues to build the
architecture for its own determinations of jurisdiction. Such a process
would support efforts to allow for an interpretation of those crimes that
would give guidance to victim groups, world leaders, and the world
community such that binding internalization of norins would work toward
the ultimate goal of protecting vulnerable populations.

13. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 2l(l)(c) (requiring that the I.C.C. consider
"general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the
world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this
Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards," but
only where the Statute, treaties, and principles and rules of international law are not clearly
applicable).
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I. THE NARROWING SCOPE OF ICC's JURISDICTION

The ICC is still in the early phases of its development. As such, its
norms with regard to questions of jurisdiction are still malleable and open
to interpretation. Yet the current trends suggest that the ICC's jurisdiction
has narrowed significantly from what was envisioned by the Rome Statute.
National courts are not picking up the slack and prosecuting atrocity crimes.
As a result of these two trends, the ICC is now at risk of falling far short of
what the framers of and signatories to the Rome Statute intended.
A. The Rome Statute and Complementarity

In recent years, a number of cases relating to international criminal
law have focused on genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
(together referred to as "atrocity crimes"). 14 The cases vary depending on
the situation: some cases and situations are before the ICC, a permanent
institution with broad prospective jurisdiction over atrocity crimes. 15 At the
same time, a number of ad hoc international institutions have been created
to deal with specific post-conflict situations such as the International
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 16 the Extraordinary
Chambers of the Court of Cambodia, 17 and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone. 18 Additionally, national trials in Guatemala/ 9 Peru/ 0 and other

14. See, e.g., David Scheffer, Closing the Impunity Gap in U.S. Law, 8 Nw. U. J. INT'L
HUM. RTS. 30, 2 (2009).
15. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. (recognizing that the State Parties to the
Rome Statute are "[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole] and thus to contribute
to the prevention of such crimes ...").
16. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993
to create a mechanism for accountability over the war crimes and atrocities that occurred in
the early 1990s in the various conflicts occurring in the former Yugoslavia. See S.C. Res.
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). Likewise, the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in 1994 to seek accountability for the Rwandan
Genocide and other grave breaches of international law. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). Both the ICTY and ICTR are considered groundbreaking as the
first post-Nuremberg international criminal tribunals, and the first to be set up through a
Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. See Erik
Mose, Main Achievements ofthe ICTR, 3 J.INT'L CRIM. IDST. 920, 927 (2005).
17. See G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. Doc. AIRES/57/228 (May 27, 2003) (The Extraordinary
Chambers of the Court of Cambodia is most accurately characterized as a hybrid tribunal
since it is a national court that was created in a coordinated effort with the United Nations. It
is staffed by national and international judges and applies international laws. Its mandate
includes trying former Khmer Rouge members for war crimes and atrocities committed in
Cambodia during the 1970s.).
18. See S.C. Res 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (The Special Court for
Sierra Leone was established by the United Nations and Sierra Leone as a hybrid entity- a
national court that was created in a coordinated effort with the United Nations, is staffed by
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places engage in domestic interpretations of international law and the nature
of atrocity crimes. 21
The most basic common thread among all of these aforementioned
courts is their goal of seeking accountability for the worst crimes offending
ethnic and national societies as well as the international community. The
work of these courts should be considered as national and international in
nature, 22 since they address crimes and actions that both the international
and national communities would like to punish and deter in the future. In
order to be effective at this work and to maintain legitimacy at both levels,
courts must rely on both national and international mechanisms of
prevention. 23 The aspiration of this multi-level system is that those who
committed atrocity crimes -whether as senior leaders of a group, mid-level
authorities or lower level operatives - can be prosecuted and held
accountable for their actions. 24
The difficulty arises in that international and national mechanisms
have different strengths, limits, and, to a certain extent, deontological
purposes. The Rome Statute25 creates the ICC as a body independent from
national and international judges, and applies international laws. Its purpose is to try those
accused of atrocity crimes and war crimes committed during the internal conflicts in Sierra
Leone that began in 1996.).
19. See World Report 2012: Guatemala, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/
world-report-2012/guatemala (last visited May 12, 2013) (Since 2009, sporadic trials for war
crimes occurring during Guatemala's decades-long civil war have been ongoing. They
represent a small measure of accountability for the number of atrocity crimes that occurred
during the conflict.).
20. See Simon Romero, Peru's Ex-President Convicted of Rights Abuses, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/world/americas/
08fujimori.htrnl?_r=O (In 2009, Peruvian courts applied national and international law to
convict former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori of, among other charges, crimes against
humanity in the killings of twenty-five people by military death squad in the 1990s.).
21. The obligation of national courts to function on two levels - both domestic and
international- is discussed in Part I. C. See infra pp.l4-18.
22. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. (recognizing that the States Parties to
the Rome Statute are "[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole] and thus to
contribute to the prevention of such crimes.").
23. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl ("Affirming-that the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their
effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by
enhancing international cooperation .. .");see also Markus Benzing, The Complementarity
Regime of the International Criminal Court: International Criminal Justice Between State
Sovereignty and the Fight Against Impunity, in 7 MAx PLANCK Y.B. OF UNITED NATIONS L.
591, 597 (2003) (suggesting the ICC could be used to protect against victor's justice by the
state).
24. See generally C. H. Beck et al., Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article (Otto Triffterer 2d ed.
2008) [hereinafter Commentary].
25. By a vote of 120 to 7 (with twenty-one states abstaining), the international
community put forth the Rome Statute, allowing for a complementary supranational court to
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and not directly controlled by the States Parties to the treaty of the court or
the United Nations, but in relationship with the United Nations system.Z6
While a state, in dealing with harms occurring within that state's
jurisdiction, may take measures at a national level through legislation,
administrative mandate, or judicial action, in any case, it would continue to
act as the state. As such, the state may be placing the interest of the state
ahead of 'justice," which is sometimes amorphous and uneasily defined. 27
In those circumstances, the potential exists for interference in the judicial
processes of the state by parts of the state apparatus seeking to prevent
prosecution of crimes for political reasons or otherwise. 28
The Rome Statute attempts to account for that concern with its
provisions on complementarity and admissibility by striking a balance and
allowing the States Parties to take the lead on prosecuting atrocity crimes
by making the following inadmissible to the ICC: (1) the state that has
jurisdiction over the case is investigating or prosecuting the crime; (2) the
investigating or prosecuting state is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry
out the investigation or prosecution; or (3) after an investigation, the state
with jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute, but the decision resulted
from the unwillingness or inability of the state to genuinely prosecute; and
(4) the case does not have sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
Court.Z9 Under this standard, States Parties to the Rome Statute would have
the first opportunity to engage in a good faith investigation into the alleged
crimes? 0
The complementary nature of the ICC has raised many questions
about the demarcation of responsibility between the national courts and the
try alleged perpetrators of some of the crimes of primary interest to the international
community. M. CHERJF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 32 (1998) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (For more
information on the Rome Statute, see generally COMMENTARY, supra note 24).
26. See generally COMMENTARY, supra note 24.
27. KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 322 (highlighting the distorting effects of domestic
political pressures).
28. Such interference occurred in conjunction with the lack of domestic prosecution of
high-ranking officials with regard to the situation in Darfur, Sudan, alleging genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. See generally Matthew H. Charity, The Criminalized
State: The International Criminal Court, the Responsibility to Protect, and Darfur, the
Republic of Sudan, 37 Omo N.U. L. REv. 67 (2011). The refusal to arrest Omar al-Bashir by
government officials in Kenya stands as an example of that interference challenged by
internal judicial processes, as the Kenyan Supreme Court in November 2011 found that al
Bashir's arrest must go into effect should he visit Kenya in the future. See James Macharia,
Kenyan Court Issues Arrest Order for Sudan's Bashir, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2011, 1:50PM
EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ll/28/us-kenya-bashir-icc-idUSTRE7AROYA20
111128. Likewise, such interference has occurred with regard to the ongoing situation in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. See infra Part I. C. (discussing the case of Bosco Ntaganda).
29. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17.
30. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. (stating that the ICC "shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions ..."). I d. art. 1.
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ICC. Much of the scholarship relating to the complementary nature of the
ICC's jurisdiction relates to antagonistic complementarity31 -the ability of
the ICC to intervene by taking jurisdiction where the state with primary
jurisdiction fails to genuinely investigate or prosecute credible allegations
of crimes falling within the ICC's jurisdiction?2 Other scholars focus on the
obligation of national courts to prosecute atrocity crimes, noting the
possible obligation to implement the laws against international crimes
"subject to the ICC's jurisdiction in their national laws and furthermore to
establish extra-territorial, universal jurisdiction which enables their national
criminal courts to adjudicate these crimes even if they have been committed
abroad by a foreign national. " 33
Even states that do not recognize an obligation on the part of States
Parties to incorporate those criminal provisions into their internal law have
frequently adopted the language of the Rome Statute to increase the state's
ability to cooperate with the ICC, both in support of the Rome Statute and,
potentially, to enforce decisions taken by the Security Council. 34
If the ICC fails to use this norm-setting moment in the codification of

31. By antagonistic complementarity, I reference the theory that the ICC will serve to
shame and blame states that fail to properly prove willingness and ability to prosecute
crimes. See, e.g., KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 320 (citing A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 353 (OUP, Oxford 2003), stating as one of complementarity's chief merits
"the indirect but powerful incentive to [national courts] becoming more operational and
effective, inherent in the power of the ICC to substitute for national judges, whenever they
are not in a position to dispense justice or they deliberately fail to do so [ ...] ."); see also
Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law: Rebuilding National
Courts Through Transnational Networks, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1, 51 (2009) ("The primary role
that the ICC was expected to play in post-conflict states parties was to spur domestic
prosecution of known perpetrators to avoid the perceived loss of face and sovereignty costs
of having the ICC pursue those prosecutions internationally."). This is distinct from the
concept of (1) negative complementarity, which does not of necessity seek compliance
through a shaming mechanism, but only empowers the ICC to act where there is a lack of
action by national courts, and (2) positive complementarity, which looks to the ICC to
engage with states that otherwise would have jurisdiction to further enable those states to
prosecute alleged crimes.
32. See e.g., Jann K. Kleffuer, The Impact of Complementarity on National
Implementation of Substantive International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. J. 86, 87 (2003)
[hereinafter Kleffuer, The Impact of Complementarity].
33. Id. at n. 18 (quoting the Memorie van Toelichting Wet Internationale Misdrijven,
Dutch Explanatory Memorandum on Substantive Implementing Legislation Kamerstukken II
2001/02, 28 337, nr. 3 (MvT) pp. 2 & 18).
34. See, e.g., id. at n. 13 (citing Spanish Progress Report on ratification and
implementation of the Rome Statute to the Council of Europe, available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/Source/ICC/4th%20Consult%20ICC%20%282006%29%2
008%20E%20Spain.pdt); see also Scheffer, supra note 14, at 3 ("Paradoxically, even as a
non-party to the Rome Statute of the ICC (the 'Rome Statute'), the United States today
essentially stands more exposed to its jurisdiction than do American allies that have
modernized their criminal codes.").
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international criminal law35 to expand on protections to those subject to
atrocity crimes, States Parties seeking to avoid the time, expense, and
political repercussions of their own prosecutions would have a strong
argument that domestic prosecutions would engage in overreach. The
expansion of international criminal law represented by the creation of the
ICC would, in effect, make way at this early stage for the contraction of
international criminal justice.
B. The Gravity Standard Since the Inception ofthe International Criminal
Court
In negotiating the Rome Treaty during the 1990s, drafters drew much
of the language defining the particular underlying crimes over which the
ICC would have jurisdiction from recent precedent: the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; 36 the Statutes for the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia37 and
Rwanda; 38 and the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind. 39
The interaction and transnational dialogue that was prevalent after the
U.S. Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, and the World Wars 40 at all times
demanded an interpretation of protection from atrocities, and the extent of
punishment for wrongdoing was lacking in the context of the development
of the ICC. For the majority of the pre-Rome Statute period, there existed
little interest in the creation of a fairly powerful permanent institution with
components of criminal law authority. Because the emphasis of pre-Rome
Statute criminal justice efforts was largely retrospective and specific

35. See generally, Lisa J. LaPlante, The Domestication oflnternational Criminal Law:
A Proposal for Expanding the International Criminal Court's Sphere of Influence, 43 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 635, 639-42 (2010); see generally Schabas, supra note 4.
36. See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/instree/xlcppcg.htm (defining genocide in legal terms for use in the international
community).
37. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 ofthe Security Council Resolution 808,, 12, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993)
(statute establishing jurisdiction and parameters for the ICTY); S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (deciding that an international tribunal was necessary to try
atrocity crimes in the former Yugoslavia).
38. See generally S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the
ICTR and annexing its statute).
39. See generally Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security ofMankind, Int'l
Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532; GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1996) (reporting
to the U.N. General Assembly with a code that derives from the Articles of the Nuremberg
Charter, which also derive description of criminal acts from the World War I Commission).
40. The transnational legal process engaged in after each of these conflicts is discussed
in detail in Part II infra.
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(responding to previous problems of which we have become aware from
recent experience) as opposed to developing best responses for the
problems that we have today or are likely to face prospectively, much of the
discussion has focused on the application of general principles of criminal
law regarding rights of the accused, the application oflex lata41 at a time of
legal development, and interpretation of treaty provisions in a strict sense
such that the defendant benefits from any confusion in the law of the ICC. 42
While this incrementalism and limited scope may give comfort to
States Parties signing the Rome Statute that smaller steps will prevent
surprise and allow for the Office of the Prosecutor to develop clear and
cogent theories of a fairly narrow reading of the case, this very behavior
undermines some of the purpose of the ICC. 43 Further, based on the
observed difficulty of prosecution by an international tribunal, criminal
trials undertaken by individual states may suffer from every structural and
procedural weakness of the ICC, but without the perceived autonomy or
international legitimacy (in many cases) that the ICC has. 44
C. The Case ofBosco Ntaganda and the ICC's Problematically Narrow

Jurisdiction

The difficulties are best seen in considering norm development within
the ICC's structure. Article 58 of the Rome Statute requires that the PreTrial Chamber45 issue a warrant of arrest if after examining the application
and the evidence submitted by the Prosecutor it determines that "[t]here are
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within

41. Indeed, questions of whether the ICC would focus only on settled law (lex lata) and
not deal with more poorly defined law in development (lex ferenda) influenced the selection
of these cognizable international crimes and forestalled the implementation of a defined
crime of aggression.
42. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 24 (Non-retroactivity ratione personae).
43. See, e.g., Uwe Ewald, 'Predictably Irrational'- International Sentencing and Its
Discourse against the Backdrop of Preliminary Empirical Findings on ICTY Sentencing
Practices, 10 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 365, 383 (2010) (noting that "acceptance of penalties is
directly related to an understanding of usefulness of criminal punishment"); Julian Ku & Jide
Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian
Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 777, 780-81 (2006) (challenging the notion that
International Criminal Tribunals actually serve to deter crimes).
44. The resistance received by certain states that were more likely to allow for trials of
higher ranking officials under a theory of universal jurisdiction evidences this problem: the
financial incentives to allow for greater trade and to continue involvement in regional
organizations may influence states such as Afghanistan, Belgium, and Spain to create laws
that will limit rather than further enhance jurisdiction.
45. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 34(b) (establishing a Pre-Trial
Chamber of the ICC to deal with, among other duties, admissibility of cases to the Trial
Chamber of the ICC).
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the jurisdiction of the Court. "46 Due to complementarity concerns and the
ICC's reserve status, the ICC only has jurisdiction where the case is of
sufficient gravity for the higher level of international consideration.47
On February 10, 2006, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC refused to
grant a warrant for the arrest of Bosco Ntaganda, the third-in-command of
the Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo (FPLC), the military
arm of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC). 48 The Pre-Trial Chamber
recognized that Ntaganda conscripted, trained, and forced children under
the age of fifteen to participate in hostilities. 49 Ntaganda was subject to an
arrest warrant in Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo, on charges of joint
criminal enterprise, arbitrary arrest, torture, and complicity of
assassination. 50 Although the arrest warrant was issued, the Democratic
Republic of Congo did not seek Ntaganda for the conscription of child
soldiers, which would be considered an atrocity crime. 5 1
In reviewing the case against Ntaganda, the Pre-Trial Chamber
decided to look at whether a claim would be admissible to the ICC 52 prior to
making a determination of whether to issue a warrant for Ntaganda's

46. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 58(l)(a).
47. While not probative of the proper interpretation, the travaux preparatoires may be
considered to confirm an understanding of a treaty, under a customary law application of the
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, art. 32(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 351.
One can, therefore, look to The Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, Vol. I, G.A. 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, A/51/22 (1996) to
confirm Article 17's limit on the scope of jurisdiction: "There was general agreement
concerning the importance oflimiting the jurisdiction of the Court to the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole, as indicated in the ... preamble, to
avoid trivializing the role and functions of the Court and interfering with the jurisdiction of
national courts." DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 25, at 394.
48. The Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo (FPLC) was the military wing
of the Union des Patriotes Congolais, a Congolese political and militia group formed in the
early 2000s. See Justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Background, HAGUE
JUSTICE PoRTAL (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=l1284.
The FPLC was suspected of engaging in numerous war crimes, including the conscription of
child soldiers and the killing of civilians and U.N. peacekeepers. Situation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.
php?id=6174 (last visited May 12, 2013).
49. See Justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Background, HAGUE JusTICE
PORTAL (Dec. 17, 2009) http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=11284; see also
DR Congo: Arrest Bosco Ntagandafor ICC Trial, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 13, 2012),
http ://www.hrw. org/news/20 12/04/13/dr-congo-arrest-bosco-ntaganda-icc-trial
(detailing
allegations of the various war crimes in which Ntaganda was involved, including ethnic
cleansing, rape, torture and the conscription and training of child soldiers).
50. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, '1['1[ 25, 34, 40 (acknowledging that domestic
courts were adequately dealing with these allegations with regard to Ntaganda).
51. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, 11 25, 34, 40 (discussing the failure of
domestic courts to address the conscription issue).
52. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 17, 19, 53, 58.
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arrest. 53 The Pre-Trial Chamber then set a standard that matched the
Prosecution's own prioritization of cases using a gravity standard,54 "that,
as a general rule, the Office of the Prosecutor should focus its investigative
and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest
responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organisation allegedly
responsible for those crimes."55
Therefore, the Pre-Trial Chamber set up a definition of a gravity
threshold for admissibility based on the language of the Rome Statute that
asked three questions, all of which had to be answered affirmatively for the
case to be considered admissible. 56 First, the Pre-Trial Chamber asked
whether the conduct alleged was "systematic" or occurred on a "large
scale." 57 The next question was whether the potential defendant can be
considered a "senior leader" in committing the alleged war crimes. 58 The
final element was consideration of whether the role played by the potential
defendant warranted admissibility to the ICC. 59
The Pre-Trial Chamber recognized that the alleged policy/practice of

53. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, ~~ 17- 20.
54. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(d), ("[T]he Court shall determine that a case
is inadmissible where ... [t]he case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
Court."
55. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, ~ 62 (quoting Paper on Some Policy Issues
Before the Office of the Prosecutor, 7 (2003), http://www.amicc.org/docs/OcampoPolicyPaper9_
03.pdf.)
56. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, ~ 64. The Pre-Trial Chamber defined the
gravity standard as follows:
any case arising from an investigation before the Court will meet the gravity
threshold provided for in article 17(1)(d) of the Statute if the following three
questions can be answered affirmatively:
i) Is the conduct which is the object of a case systematic or large scale
(due consideration should also be given to the social alarm caused to the
international community by the relevant type of conduct)?; ii)
Considering the position of the relevant person in the State entity,
organisation or armed group to which he belongs, can it be considered
that such person falls within the category of most senior leaders of the
situation under investigation?; and iii) Does the relevant person fall
within the category of most senior leaders suspected of being most
responsible, considering (1) the role played by the relevant person
through acts or omissions when the State entities, organisations or
armed groups to which he belongs commit systematic or large-scale
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and (2) the role played by
such State entities, organisations or armed groups in the overall
commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court in the
relevant situation?
!d.
57. !d.
58. Id.
59. Id. See also Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, 6
(2003), http://www.amicc.org/docs/OcampoPolicyPaper9_ 03 .pdf.
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enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen into the FPLC,
and causing them to participate in active hostilities, caused social alarm; the
Pre-Trial Chamber looked at the scale of the conduct and found it to be
regional instead of national and, therefore, not widespread. 60 The Pre-Trial
Chamber then concluded that Ntaganda's role in the organization as third in
command of the military wing meant that he had little control over the
political wing of the organization and that his responsibilities were more
limited than the most senior leaders of the organization. 61 Finally, the PreTrial Chamber considered Ntaganda's inability to sign agreements binding
the political organization62 and the lack of social alarm at his acts 63 showed
that his arrest would not serve as a deterrent to other leaders. Because of
these findings, the Pre-Trial Chamber denied the requested warrant of arrest
and concluded that the prosecutor should focus its efforts on others who
were the most senior leaders. 64
The Appeals Chamber65 pointed out numerous flaws in the Pre-Trial
Chamber's analysis. First, it noted that Ntaganda was deeply involved with
the recruiting of child soldiers, that the war crime with which he was
charged did not require it be widespread, and that there was nothing in the
Rome Statute that would allow for the subjective "social alarm test" that the
Pre-Trial Chamber applied. 66 Second, the Appeals Chamber concluded that
failing to arrest Ntaganda would put a large number of alleged criminals on
notice that they need not fear arrest, even for serious crimes. 67 Under the
Rome Statute, this deterrent effect is one of the purposes of maintaining a
broad scope for admissibility of cases similar to that of Ntaganda. 68 Third,
even if Ntaganda was not the most senior leader in this conflict, lower and
mid-level operatives sometimes are (and should be) arrested to help build a
case against the most senior leaders. 69 The Pre-Trial Chamber failed to

60. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, '1!'\f 72, 84 (UPC/FPLC was merely a
regional group operating only in the Ituri region.).
61. !d. 'lf'lf 79, 82, 85, 89.
62. !d. 'lf'lf 86, 87.
63. The question of social alarm was not fully explained by the Pre-Trial Chamber, an
issue raised in the review of the decision by the Appeals Chamber.
64. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, 'lf'lf 86, 87.
65. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 34(b) (establishing an Appeals
Chamber for the ICC with jurisdiction to review decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the
Trial Chamber).
66. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment on the Prosecutor's
Appeal against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58," Case No. ICC-0 1/04-169, 'lf'lf 69-72 (July 13,
2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc183559.pdf [hereinafter Appeal of
Pre-trial Chamber I].
67. Appeal of Pre-trial Chamber I, supra note 66, 'lf'lf 73-77.
68. !d. 'lf'lf 77-78.
69. !d. 'If 77.

442

IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

[Vol. 23:3

acknowledge or apply these purposes of the Rome Statute. 70
The potential effect of the initial failure to prosecute in the Ntaganda
case may be profound. First, there was a ripple effect on other situations
being considered for admissibility to the ICC. The decision not to prosecute
Ntaganda led to the expansion of a loophole created by an agreement with
the government of Uganda in 2003 in another case. 71 Second, from a normsetting perspective, the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision not to prosecute gave
rise to the practice of the ICC not prosecuting perpetrators other than those
few most responsible. Indeed, in issuing a decision for the warrant of arrest
ofOmar al-Bashir, 72 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I noted in 2009 that the flawed
test offered in the Ntaganda case was still the only standard for
consideration by the ICC, presuming the ICC considered it appropriate to
determine the admissibility of a case on gravity grounds. 73
D. Domestic Courts and International Legal Obligations

The failure of the ICC to act in cases like that of Ntaganda is
exacerbated by the lack of top-down pressure on domestic courts to
prosecute, the failure of domestic courts to fulfill their international
obligations, and the failure of State Parties to engage in transnational
interaction and discussion regarding harms in violation of international
principles and the adoption by states of mechanisms for the vindication of
human rights. Adding to these shortcomings, the purported sanctioning
tools of negative complementarity failed to provide a remedy to at risk
populations.
1. Lack ofTop-Down Pressure

Unfortunately, the same standards that lead to compliance pull may
evidence the limits on complementarity's applicability. An ability to
comply with the letter of the law - here, the terms of the Rome Statute 'may undermine some purposes of international criminal law. Prosecutorial

70. See Appeal of Pre-trial Chamber I, supra note 66.
71. See Emmanuel Mulondo & Gerald Walulya, Uganda: 'No Amnesty for Rebel
Leaders,' ALLAFRICA (Apr. 19 2006), http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200604180779.html;
KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 325 ("[T]he prosecutorial policy of limiting the action of the
Office of the Prosecutor to a certain category of individuals found reflection in the
amendment of the Amnesty Act, thus equally limiting the scope of potential national
investigations and prosecutions to these persons.").
72. See Charity, supra note 28, at 72-77 (explaining the background of the situation in
the Darfur region of Sudan, as well as allegations made against Omar al-Bashir).
73. Situation in Darfur, Sudan, In the Case of the Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad alBashir (Omar al-Bashir), Case Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09, n. 51 (Mar. 04, 2009),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.
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discretion allows States Parties wide latitude to refuse to try cases, and
states are not under significant pressure to reach beyond the highest level
offenders in their prosecutorial decisions.
In determining whether States Parties have complied with their
international obligations to prosecute, the ICC first looks to the terms of the
Rome Statute,74 the Elements of Crimes, 75 and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. 76 Second, the ICC looks to applicable treaties other than the
Rome Statute, and principles and rules of international law including
established principles of the Law of Armed Conflict. 77 Lastly, only absent
general principles of international law, the ICC considers principles derived
from national laws of legal systems of the world, where those laws are not
inconsistent with the Rome Statute, or with international law and
internationally recognized norms and standards. 78 Notwithstanding and
separate from these recognized sources of law, the ICC may apply
interpretations of principles and rules of law from its own previous
decisions, which one might presume would not conflict with the Rome
Statute or other international standards of international criminallaw. 79 None
of these mechanisms put a significant amount of pressure on domestic
courts to fulfill their international obligations.

2. Transnational Legal Processes
Were national courts more actively describing their own
understanding of the core crimes, similar to the analyses that must be made
in considering potential prosecutions by the ICC, there would be greater
interaction among parties trying to achieve the goal of ending impunity, and
helping to determine a causal law that might prevent harm to populations

74. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(a) (lex specialis relating to statutory
interpretation ofiCC-instituted International Criminal Law).
75. See generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES
(2011 ), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ff5dd7d2.html.
76. See generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%
20texts%20and%20tools/official%20joumal/Documents/RPE.4th.ENG.08Febl200.pdf.
77. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 2l(l)(b).
78. Id. art. 2l(l)(c). The drafters compromised further by stating that "general principles
oflaw derived by the Court from national laws oflegal systems of the world include[s], as
appropriate, the national laws of the States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the
crime ...." Id. Although such a reading might prevent harm to the accused under the nulla
poena sine lege standard, in that the accused might have greater awareness of the illegality of
an act under, for example, national or territorial jurisdiction of a particular state, the
Conference of the ICC Statute "rejected the view of some delegations that the phrase
'including, as appropriate' should be replaced with 'especially'." COMMENTARY, supra note
24, at 703. Thus, the laws of the state that would normally exercise jurisdiction have no
presumptive authority greater than other national laws oflegal systems of the world.
79. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(2).
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caused by atrocity crimes.
Taking a transnational legal process approach,80 national
representatives have in previous contexts adopted or recognized existing
principles under international law norms, 81 met in groups to discuss
implementation of international law standards, 82 and have pushed for the
internalization of those standards within a transnational, supranational, or
international structure. 83
The concern over restrictive standards undermining the object and
purpose of the Rome Statute, and the principles of law the Statute supports,
could be raised in the selection and prosecution of a number of cases and

80. Harold Hongju Koh describes the transnational legal process as having three phases:
One or more transnational actors provoke an interaction (or series of interactions) with
another, which forces an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm applicable to the
situation. By so doing, the moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to
internalize the new interpretation of the international norm into the other party's internal
normative system. The aim is to 'bind' that other party to obey the interpretation as part of
its internal value set. Such a transnational legal process is normative, dynamic, and
constitutive. The transaction generates a legal rule, which will guide future transnational
interactions between the parties; future transactions will further internalize those norms; and
eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to reconstitute the interests and
even the identities of the participants in the process. Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law? The New Sovereignty: Compliance with
International Regulatory Agreements by Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, 106
YALE L. J. 2599, 2646 (1997) (emphasis added); see also Leila Nadya Sadat, The Nuremberg
Paradox, 58 AM. J. CoMP. L. 151, 162 (2010) (describing "the existence oftransnationallegal
processes that lead courts, especially, to adopt international norms," in the context of French
adoption of the Nuremberg principles in prosecutions of crimes against humanity).
81. See, e.g., MANUALOFTHELAWSOFWARONLAND(Oxford, Sept. 9, 1880), available
at http://www.icrc.org/ihVINTR0/140?0penDocument (noting that the Institute of
International Law "believes it is fulfilling a duty in offering to the governments a 'Manual'
suitable as the basis for national legislation in each State, and in accord with both the
progress of juridical science and the needs of civilized armies ... [and, in not trying to add
new law, the Institute] contented itself with stating clearly and codifying the accepted ideas
of our age so far as this has appeared allowable and practicable." Id. at Preface (describing
this facet of transnational legal process as interacting from a positivist (or objective law)
perspective)).
82. See Robert 0. Keohane, Jr., Institutional Theory and Realist Challenge after the
Cold War, in NEOREALISM & NEOLIBERALISM 269 (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993) (describing
this facet of transnational legal process as interpreting the standards in specific contexts
through commissions or other institutions). This is an institutionalized perspective that
eventually looks to the International Law Commission or its committees for guidelines as to
the development of the ICC.
83. This could be described as a constructivist approach- determining the constitution
ofrules related to the identified norms, and allowing for the further implementation of norms
through that construct. See John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together?
Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52(4) INT'L ORG. 855, 871 (1988)
(noting that "Constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up a particular class of
consciously organized social activity-that is to say, they specifY what counts as that
activity.").
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for many reasons. One important area in which the conflict in rule-setting
with regard to the definition of crimes has clearly arisen is the consideration
of gravity as an indicator of admissibility on both qualitative and
. . ground s. 84
quant1tat1ve
Considering the usurpation of authority a potential indicator of overall
governmental incapacity or specific complicity with the alleged crime
suggests an incentive for state governments to make every effort to retain
authority over adjudication. 85 In doing so, however, the state tribunals need
not behave as though exercising powers delegated to the States by the ICC,
and therefore limited to the interpretation of those powers by the ICC.
Rather, to the extent the articulation of specific crimes by the ICC reflects
jus cogens forbidding atrocity crimes, 86 the adoption and implementation by
states of the ICC statute creates an opportunity for states to define the
jurisprudence of international criminal law in conjunction with the ICC
statute.
3. The Decoupling ofState Actors' Roles and Redoubling ofa State
Actors ' Efforts

The lack of transnational legal process is not the only obstacle to
positive norm-setting on the national level. In addition, States Parties are
failing to live up to their own obligation to act on two levels and with two
purposes: on the national and international level; and with the dual purposes
of 1) enforcing domestic norms and 2) informing and enriching
international norms in the process.
The concept of jus cogens or "compelling law" that allows no
derogation is a kindred spirit to the notion of le droit des gens, or "the law
of people" described by French law professor and original member of the
UN International Law Commission Georges Scelle. 87 In Scelle' s Precis du
droit des gens, he cites to Montesquieu's definition that "Laws are

84. See, e.g., Ewald, supra note 43, at 371; see generally Schabas, supra note 4.
85. KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 317-18 ("Complementarity. bestows upon national
proceedings the pedigree of 'willingness' and 'ability' when the Court determines that a case
is inadmissible in accordance with Article 17(1)(a) to (c) of the Statute."); id. at 320
(discussing the "largely antagonist premise on which the regime of complementarity is based
... [where States] want to avoid the embarrassment that a declaration of admissibility would
entail.").
86. In agreeing to the particular crimes included in the Rome Statute, some states noted
that this would not create additional laws. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §103 (1965), cmt. K, Reporter's Notes 6; id. §
702 (listing state violations ofperemptory norms).
87. See, e.g., Hubert Thierry, The Thought of Georges Scelle, 1 EuR. J. INT'L L. 193,
198 n.lO (1990) (using the "law of people" as opposed to the more typical translation "Law
ofNations" clarifies the role of the individual as "the only genuine subject[] of international
law.").
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necessary relationships which derive from the nature of things," to lead to
the concept of a law of integration and progress leading to "objective
law."88 Because this objective law conforms to social necessities, positive
law that derogates from objective law- that fails to conform to those social
necessities -becomes anti-legal, and may be rejected. 89 Binding positive
law gains its validity from the bundle of conditions necessary for the
existence of a social fact, without which the social fact could neither come
about nor persist. 90 These purported causal laws that support social
functioning are not necessarily enunciated as positive law, but are the basis
around which legislators might construe and assess positive law. 91

88. ld. at 199 (citing GEORGES SCELLE, PRECIS DU DROIT DES GENS, 37 (Vol. I. 2008),
for the concept that objective law develops from social reality). See also, Georges Scelle,
Regles Gemirales du Droit de fa Paix, in 46 RECUEIL DES COURS DEL'ACADEMIE DE LAHAYE
327 (1933) [hereinafter Scelle]:
Le droit objectif est !'ensemble des lois causales qui determinent !'apparition,
la permanence et le developpement du fait social .... La traduction normative
de ces lois causales immanentes s'appelle le droit positif. Le droit positifn'est
done, par defmition, que la transposition sur le plan normatif des lois causales
d'une societe. Cette transposition peut etre d'ordre coutmnier ou instinctive;
d'ordre legislatif, reglementaire; d'ordre autocratique ou conventiennel .... Il
se peut, il est meme frequent, que le droit positif differe et s, ecarte du droit
objectif, que la norme sociale difrere de la loi causale, soit parce que
l'infmnite de l'agent coutmnier ou legislatif empeche le droit objectif d'etre
totalement peryu, soit parce que les insuffisances techniques de !'organisation
sociale empechent une totale juxtaposition du systeme de lois et du systeme de
normes. Cependant, par une hypothese necessaire, il faut considerer comme
acquis, jusqu'a preuve contraire, qu'il y a coincidence exacte entre l'un et
l'autre, car sans cela le droit positifne pourrait pas avoir de valeur obligatoire.
La validite (geltung) du droit positif reside, en effet, dans sa concordance avec
le droit objectif. ("Objective law is the conglomeration of causal laws which
determine the appearance, permanence, and development of social facts . . . .
The normative translation of these self-made causal laws is positive law.
Positive law, then, is only, by definition, the transposition of a society's causal
laws onto a normative plane. This transposition can be either through custom
or instinct; through a legislative or regulatory means; from a despotic or
conventional society .... It can happen, it's even frequent, that positive law
differs and separates from objective law, that the social norm differs from the
causal law, either because a weakness in the customary or legislative agent
prevents the law from being totally perceived, or because insufficient
technique in the social organization prevents a total juxtaposition of the
system of norms and the system of laws. However, as a necessary hypothesis,
one must take for given, until the opposite is proven, that the two exactly
coincide, because otherwise positive law could have no obligatory value. The
validity ofpositive law rests, in effect, in its agreement with objective law.").
!d. at 348-50.
89. Thierry, supra note 87, at 199.
90. Id. (A rule not necessary toward the existence of a social fact would therefore not be
"objective law.").
91. !d. at 198.
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In the context of international, supranational, and extra-national
relations, actions taken by state actors "are by nature international, since
their goal, and result, is to realize this phenomenon of [legal monist]
solidarity or international relations, and they are, and can only be,
accomplished in conformity to international norms." 92 While the state actors
could, therefore, act from a national or international perspective, and where
there exist no specifically international leaders or agents, the state leaders
and agents that stand in for the specifically international leaders/agents take
on a "double role." 93 They are national agents and leaders when they
function in the state juridical order; they are international agents and leaders
when they act in the international juridical order. 94 Scelle describes this dedoublement fonctionnel - as the fundamental law of the uncoupling of
functions, but most describe it as "role splitting." 95
In the context of complementarity before the ICC, some have posited
that instead of having to uncouple a national and international function, the
national court and the international court exist in a relation of role
concurrence - in the first instance, the national court may take jurisdiction
over the trial of an alleged perpetrator of an atrocity crime, but the
international court will exercise its role in prosecuting the perpetrator when
the national court's failure to prosecute activates the international court's
concurrent jurisdiction. 96 Because they both may take responsibility for the

92. Scelle, supra note 88, at 358 ("[1]1 reste que ces fonctions sont par nature
internationales, puisqu'elles ont pour but et pour resultat de donner satisfaction a un
phenomene de solidarite ou a des rapports internationaux et qu'elles sont et ne peuvent etre
accomplies que conformement aux normes internationales.").
93. See Antonio Cassese, Remarks on Scelle's Theory of "Role Splitting"
(DMoublement Fonctionnel) in International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 210, 212 (1990).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 214.
96. Some have referenced such an obligation as "role concurrence," or the simultaneous
protection of important legal values of the international community and the national legal
order. KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 32 (citing Otto Triffterer, Preliminary Remarks: The
Permanent International Criminal Court-Ideal and Reality, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRJMINAL COURT-OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY
ARTICLE 26-28 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). While the concept of role concurrence is, indeed,
a departure from Scelle's construct, it would appear less a departure in translating
dedoublement as uncoupling - that is, each state that acts in the international community
necessarily acts through its organs in both domestic and international spheres. Where law
exists in the international sphere and international courts do not exist or are otherwise unable
to implement that law, the courts of the state act to fulfill the obligations of the state.
Because such courts are applying binding international standards on behalf of the state, the
courts must uncouple the two roles that of state court with that of international court. The
court doing otherwise would be anti-legal, undermining an international rule of law. See,
e.g., Scelle, supra note 88, at 657:
If the connection of juridical situations puts into play the competence of
government actors of other states, or actors with concurrent responsibility, the
role of government actors careful to procure the realization of law in a
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prosecution, the international and national courts would share the role of
preventing and punishing atrocity crimes. 97
The potential for shared jurisdiction may deviate from the notion of a
concurrent role as opposed to a shared role. To the extent that national
courts have a responsibility to vindicate supranational or meta-nationae 8
harms arising from atrocity crimes, the role is certainly not dissimilar from
that exercised by the ICC - both the ICC and national courts are
prosecuting alleged perpetrators of atrocity crimes. Realistically, however,
crimes vindicated by the ICC must be limited qualitatively and
quantitatively by virtue of limited jurisdiction and resources, as well as
concerns for sovereign control over criminal justice matters. 99 As such, the
national courts have an opportunity to revisit the goal of what Scelle would
refer to as the underlying "objective law," to determine which cases can and
should be prosecuted by the national courts, even where the ICC would
elect not to prosecute or would find the case inadmissible for lack of

recognized interstate milieu will consist of a coercive act exercised on their
governmental actor colleagues to obtain from them the regular utilization of
their competences.
See also id. at 667:
We are preoccupied with intervention only in international relations. But we
know as well that there's no divider between an internal juridical order and the
international juridical order: the extent of the latter determines the structure of
the fonner, and when the competence of subjects oflaw, including nationals in
interstate commerce, are covered by an international norm, the application of
this norm stems from international law, even in relations between the
governing and the governed, immediate subjects of the law of people.
97. This shared responsibility echoes the logic of the Responsibility to Protect, in that
the state would have primacy over the international community, but the international
community may need to act to put an end to crimes against humanity (including the crime of
persecution through ethnic cleansing), genocide, or war crimes. See 2005 World Summit
Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ,, 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 15, 2005) (United
Nations General Assembly reaffirming World Summit Outcome on Responsibility to
Protect, available at http://www.globalr2p.org/media/flles/wsod_2005.pdf [hereinafter 2005
World Summit Outcome]; see also Gareth Evans, Crimes Against Humanity and
Responsibility to Protect, in FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 2
(Leila Nadya Sadat, ed. 2011); see generally Charity, supra note 28.
98. "Meta-national" refers to the community of peoples, and the joint interest of the
nation of nations, as opposed to any smaller group that may have bilateral or other smaller
group commonalities at a level hierarchically superior to the nation (supranational). See
KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 316 (claiming state promotion of matter from a national to the
international realm ensures and protects "meta-national values, such as peace, human dignity
and the needs of all mankind," in describing gradual development toward a "universal" law
of the world community).
99. Schabas, supra note 4, at 542, 544 (noting that there are simply not enough resources
for international criminal tribunals to aspire to prosecute all international crimes within their
jurisdiction, and that the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
explains the choice of situations selected by referencing the "gravity" of the situation).
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gravity. 100 The role of the national court is, in the first instance, a greater
role, because it may act without the strictures and limitations of the Rome
Statute to prosecute perpetrators in a manner that effectively protects its
populations prior to the ICC considering admissibility under a
complementarity regime.
None of this suggests that national courts should elect to use
substantially different national standards over international standards;
rather, because of the deontological differences in the international and
domestic tribunals and the fact that international standards require different
duties of international courts than of national courts, the use of international
standards in the investigation and punishment of crimes against humanity
by courts should and must be done differently in domestic tribunals than in
international tribunals. 101 Even in approaching the same end, the
complementarity regime and the history of the development of the atrocity
crimes demand a different approach of national courts.
4. Why Negative Complementarity Fails to Offer Sufficient Incentives
to Ensure Enforcement

Many commentators have considered the utility of the ICC from the
perspective of negative complementarity. 102 In considering the object and
purpose of the Rome Statute, negative complementarity is the ability of the
ICC to initiate an investigation only after the state that would otherwise
have jurisdiction has failed to do so. 103 It is imperative to look at the goal of
the international community and the roles of the state and the ICC in that
process. The goal of the international community is the protection of human
lives from the harms of aggressive war, genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes. However, these goals are not achieved when the ICC and
the national courts and governments working complementary to each other,
are on somewhat independent spheres under a negative complementarity
framework.
One theory supporting the framework of negative complementarity
focuses on the principle of domestic interest in several ways: first, in
promoting a positive world perception of the state's judiciary and its

100. One might reference this as a "redoublement fonctionnel," or a functional
redoubling of the state actor's efforts- exercising a metanational responsibility that the state
could have chosen to opt out of, for the purpose of vindicating a core international
responsibility.
10 1. Cassese, supra note 93, at 213.
102. See, e.g., Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda,
Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 107 (2009);
William A. Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19
CRIM. L.F. 5 (2008); Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of
Article 17 ofthe Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 CRIM. L.F. 255 (2006).
103. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17.
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general capacity and support for the rule of law over anti-legal. government
acts or actors; 104 second, the state's interest in maintaining its sovereignty
over matters arguably within its domestic sphere, as opposed to yielding
sovereignty over certain criminal matters to an extra-national court; and
third, the application of the underlying laws for which the extra-national
court complements the state apparatus.
These justifications for relying on a negative complementarity
framework are predicated on the state's negative reaction to public censure
or to an extra-national sense that an act by the state breaches an
international obligation. Negative complementarity presumes that the state
might take action to avoid its control over a situation being undermined,
and that the state's reaching an agreement with the international community
on the extent of the underlying laws - whether ultimately under state or
international jurisdiction -will somehow undercut state interests. Negative
complementarity at its heart suggests that the state will do all in its power to
prevent the assertion of authority by the complementing body 105 and,
therefore, assumes that prosecution of many levels of alleged war criminals
will take place at the state level in order to prevent extra-national control
and influence.
On the international level, negative complementarity also assumes
that the ICC will do all in its power to prosecute an alleged atrocity crime
perpetrator if the state will not. However, as previously discussed, from the
perspective of limited resources, prosecutorial discretion, and a lack of
norm-setting guidance toward a scope broad enough to encompass such
crime, the ICC has not thus far lived up to its potential in this regard.
More importantly, and not considered fully in the negative
complementarity discourse, the role of the national tribunal can and should
be broader than that of the international tribunal, where the state is willing
and able to pursue a case against an alleged perpetrator. History shows that
the development of the laws on atrocity crimes has been most successful
when leaders were communicating with each other and, unfortunately,
when their populations were impacted by the atrocities. 106 While the

104. See, e.g., KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 317 ("There is no need for international
adjudicative fora if, and when, national courts can adequately achieve effective adjudication
...." Jd. (citing to the requirement in the U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary Gen.
on the Establishment of a Special Ct. for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 [10] (Oct. 4
2000), that local courts in Sierra Leone acquire additional capacity prior to the determination
of the international community's referring matters back to the state by limiting the longevity
of the Special Court, implicitly recognizing a lack of capacity at the state level)).
105. KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 320 ("for the first time in the history of international
criminal law, State Parties have agreed ex ante that this failure [to adequately investigate and
prosecute core crimes within its jurisdiction] will entail a concrete legal consequence: States
forfeiting the claim to exercise jurisdiction, including over their own nationals and
officials.").
106. See deGuzman, supra note 12, at 20-22 (arguing that the development of laws
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international court and the national court may have the same ultimate goal
of responding to an objective law relating to the prevention of atrocity
crimes, the roles ofthe courts differ. One failure of the international tribunal
is the institutionalization of its voice and the impact of its interpretation.
The example of the prosecution of Bosco Ntaganda illustrates the point.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH
ATROCITY CRIMES

To understand the development of international criminal law's focus
on atrocity crimes through a transnational legal process lens, we must start
where the nations focusing on atrocities are interacting. By looking at
responses to wars, starting in the mid-nineteenth century, we can see the
slow, but continuing, process of interaction, interpretation, and
internalization of the socil:ll mitigation of war crimes, aggression, and
crimes against humanity. 107
This series of negotiations, accords, and conventions reveals two
important lessons for current efforts at supporting a broad jurisdiction for
international criminal justice mechanisms. First, the transnational discourse
has been and can be an effective means of building state-level consensus as
to norm-setting. From a transnational legal process perspective, these postconflict interactions among states with regard to the rights and obligations
of occupying powers in late nineteenth century and twentieth century
Europe offer important parallels to our contemporary questions as to how
state-level discourse can act as a norm-setting mechanism vis-a-vis the
rights and obligations of international tribunals.
Second, the history reveals a striking pattern that persists today of an
initial post-conflict push toward international criminal norms that would
allow for broad prosecution of war crimes, only to have state-level
insecurities lead to the narrowing of the scope of the international legal
standards, a smaller number of prosecutions, and the resulting diminution of
the initially sought-after accountability and deterrent effect.

addressing atrocity crimes stemmed from atrocities suffered during World War II, and that
subsequent development occurred after the mass atrocities occurring in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia).
107. See generally DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JlRl TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS
(Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, eds. 1988); see generally International Humanitarian Law Treaties & Documents- Methods and Means of Warfare, ICRC.ORG, http://www.icrc.org/ihl
(last visited May 12, 2013) (reflecting much ofthe interactions between the states).
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A. The 1874 Brussels Conference 108

Following the Franco-Prussian War, fifteen European states gathered
to discuss the laws of war, some of which had been violated during the
course of the relatively brief, but bloody, conflict. 109 In considering a
transnational legal process approach, the interaction of the states most
affected by the war raised questions as to the proper approach to the
treatment ofwar crimes. For example, the states had to address whether an
occupying power such as Prussia had the right to defend itself against
guerilla warfare by the militia-like francs-tireurs, 110 and the mass
conscription of French citizens who were not regular soldiers, or whether
these French citizens who acted in defense of their country deserved
prisoner-of-war status.
The fifteen states utilized the code developed during the United States
Civil War by Francis Lieber 111 in an attempt to develop an "International
Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War." By building on the
Lieber Code, which in turn relied on a number of seventeenth and
eighteenth century European laws of armed conflict theorists, the leaders
hoped to set stricter guidelines for warfare and post-conflict accountability
mechanisms, as Lieber's code purported to be "strictly guided by the
principles ofjustice, honor, and humanity." 112
The Lieber Code required that soldiers show more discipline during
war than civilians. Soldiers violating the Lieber Code might face the
punishment of death, "or such other severe punishment as may seem
adequate for the gravity of the offense." 113 The penal codes applicable to
soldiers during combat would "not only punish [soldiers] as at home, but in

108. See Yves Sandoz, The History of the Grave Breaches Regime, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
657, 663-64 (2009). The article gives an excellent description of the development of grave
breaches of the laws of war. For more on the resolutions undertaken by the states parties to
the 1874 Brussels Conference on August 27, 1874, see International Humanitarian Law
Project ofan International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels,
27 August 1874, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.ns:fJINTR0/135?0penDocument.
109. For a cogent analysis of the conflict, see GEOFFREY WAWRO, THE FRANCO PRUSSIAN
WAR (Cambridge 2003).
110. Francs-tireurs, literally, "free shooters," were men living in eastern France who
trained with high quality rifles and were sometimes affiliated with the French army. When
franc-tireurs were captured, Prussians did not wish to treat them as captured enemy soldiers
because the free-shooters did not dress in uniform or fight with an organized group.
111. The code was entitled, "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field" but is generally referred to as the Lieber Code. See Ernest Nys, Francis
Lieber---His Life and His Work: Part I, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 86 (1911) (describing the
contributions of Lieber to the internationalization of the laws of war).
112. Sandoz, supra note 108, at 660; See also Francis Lieber, Instructions for the
Government ofthe Armies ofthe United States in the Field, art. 4 (Apr. 24, 1863), available
at http://www.icrc.org/ihl!INTR0/110 [hereinafter Lieber Code].
113. Sandoz, supra note 108, at 661-62; see also Lieber Code, supra note 112, art. 44.
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all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severe punishment shall be
preferred." 114 The interactive response of several nations to the perceived
violation of rights in the Franco-Prussian War allowed the parties to
develop a shared standard and joint interpretation of the Lieber Code and of
the laws and customs of war more generally. The transnational nature of
this enterprise marked a significant advance in the international discussion
of the prosecution of war crimes.
The parties adopted the International Declaration concerning the
Laws and Customs of War but did not create a binding convention. Thus,
they did not bind themselves through positive law. Notwithstanding the
failure to create a convention, one delegate suggested that states coordinate
their internal legislation to ensure equal punishment for those violating the
rules of war. 115 Perhaps due to a reluctance to cede a significant
responsibility with regard to criminal justice to a larger decision-making
body, 116 this suggestion was not acted upon, leaving the parties'
interpretation on the table at the end of the Brussels Conference.
Regardless of the reason, these countries had come together following
a conflict to consider parameters to behaviors of belligerents during time of
war, seeldng to prevent the negative consequences of other states'
overstepping those parameters. In so doing, the states came much closer to
holding themselves accountable and created a framework from which to
work in the future to define limits of warfare.
B. The Oxford Manual of1880

Notwithstanding the failure of the Brussels Declaration to be made
into a convention, the Lieber Code was not without impact. In 1880, the
Institute of International Law 117 adopted its "Manual of the Laws of War on
Land." 118 Drawing principles from the Lieber Code and the 1874 Brussels
Conference, the Manual stated that where the violation of the laws of war

114. Sandoz, supra note 108, at 662; see also Lieber Code, supra note 112, art. 47.
115. Sandoz, supra note 108, at 663.
116. Id.
117. The Institute of International Law (or Jnstitut de Droit International) is a nongovernmental body formed in 1873 to develop the standards of international law and
promote human rights. See History, INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://www.idiiil.org/idiE/navig_history.html (last visited May 16, 2013). For its influential work on
developing international law, it was awarded the 1904 Nobel Peace Prize.
118. The Laws of War on Land. Oxford, 9 September 1880, (Sept. 9, 1880), available at
http://www.icrc. org/applic/ihl/ihl.ns:fliNTR0/140?0penDocument&redirect=O. The preface
to the Manual notes that it does not seek an international treaty laying out the laws of war,
which the authors acknowledge "might perhaps be premature or at least very difficult to
obtain," but that the Manual "strengthens the discipline which is the strength of armies; it
also ennobles their patriotic mission in the eyes of the soldiers by keeping them within the
limits of respect due to the rights of humanity." Jd. at Preface.
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are at the same time offenses against the general criminal law, the
perpetrator should be tried and punished by the courts of the injured
adversary: "the offending parties should be punished, after a judicial
hearing, by the belligerent in whose hands they are ... [with the ] offenders
against the laws of war [being] liable to the punishments specified in the
penal or criminal law," when the person ofthe offender could be secured. 119
The articulation of this standard in 1880, which would. be repeated in a
second Oxford Manual of 1913, 120 would have a strong effect on the rules
agreed to by the victorious powers that would be able to claim almost thirty
years of recognition of the standard prior to seeking to apply it. As states
sought consensus on the legal rights of states to prosecute war criminals,
even those concerned with ex post facto laws recognized the right of the
injured belligerent to prosecute the captured enemy under its own laws, the
standard articulated by the International Law Institute's 1880 and 1913
Oxford Manuals. 121
C. The Hague Conference of1899

Twenty-five years after the Brussels Conference, Europe and other
states again gathered to reach a consensus in regards to the regulation of the
laws and customs of war. 122 In June 1899, the Hague Diplomatic
Conference revisited topics covered in the Brussels Declaration, including
the legality of acts between occupying powers and citizens of the occupied
state.
Belgium, a smaller nation only recognized in 1830, was concerned
that its sovereignty might be overrun by transnational norms created by
more powerful states. It was particularly concerned that rights recognized in
the Brussels Declaration granted too great a power to an occupying force
and forbade the recognition of civilians as lawful combatants when fighting

119. James W. Garner, Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War,
14 AM. J. INT'L L. 70, 71 (1920) (citing ANNuAIRE DE L'lNSTITUT [DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL],
174 (1881-1882)).
120. See Manual of the Laws of Naval War (Aug. 9, 1913), available at
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl!ihl.nsf!INTR0/265?0penDocument&redirect=O (noting the
comparable application oflaws ofland warfare (Article 79), but also noting that prisoners of
war are "subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the navy of the State in
whose power they are." (Art. 73)).
121. See, e.g., the acceptance of national tribunals to try combatants following World
War I factoring in both the Commission Report (see infra note 135, at 121), and the
Reservations of the United States (14 AM. J.INT'L. L. 95, 129 (1920)).
122. Czar Nicholas II called the conference with the intention of "seeking the most
effective means of ensuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and lasting peace, and, above
all, of limiting the progressive development of existing armaments." See Final Act of the
International Peace Conference, The Hague, July 29, 1899, available at http://www.icrc.org/
ihl.ns£'INTR0/145?0penDocument.
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an occupying force. 123 As opposed to codifying such a standard, the Belgian
delegate argued, "In my opinion, there are certain points which cannot be
made the object of a convention, and which would be better to leave as they
stand today, under the rule of the tacit and common law which results from
principles ofthe law ofnations." 124
In interpreting the language of the Brussels Declaration, the Belgian
delegate recognized that the agents of the various states were interpreting
and, potentially, codifying a standard that the representatives of smaller
states could not support, because of the power recognized in states more
likely through military strength (and in recent past experience) to occupy
those smaller states. 125 The Belgian delegate reframed the question so that
the Conference would not decide the legality or illegality of a particular act
during war; rather, the Conference would determine whether new law
would be needed as part of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land (later known as the Hague Conventions), limiting
harms that could be perpetrated by either party. 126
Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens served as a delegate from Russia, one of
the Great Powers, which supported the principles recognizing rights in
occupying powers. When the parties had reached an impasse as to the
balance of power between international and domestic control of war crimes
issues, Martens provided the following clause (later known as the Martens
Clause) for adoption:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been
issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to
declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of
the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. They
declare that it is in this sense especially that Articles 1 and

123. For a discussion of the power dynamics between the delegations during the 1899
Hague Conference, see Cassese, infra n. 124.
124. Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?, 11 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 187, n.11 (2000) (citing Conference Intemationale de la Paix, La Haye 18 Mai-29
Juillet 1899, Troisieme Partie (1899) at 111 ("Amon avis, il y a certains points, qui ne
peuvent faire !'objet d'une convention et qu'il vaudrait mieux laisser comme aujourd'hui,
sous !'empire de cette loi tacite et commune qui resulte des principes du droit des gens.")).
125. Id. at 193-98.
126. Id.
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2 of the Regulations must be understood. 127
The Belgian delegation supported this limiting language as a major
check on potential occupying powers: "[t]omorrow, as today, the rights of
the conqueror, far from being unlimited, will be restrained by the laws of
public conscience (conscience universelle) and not one country, not one
general would dare to transgress them, since that would submit oneself to
banishment from the civilized nations." 128 Notwithstanding arguments over
the accuracy of this characterization, the Conference sidestepped the
specific dispute and reached agreement on a broader point. The States
Parties to the Hague Convention of 1899 internalized not the right to
engage in patriotic resistance to an occupying force, nor a standard for the
applicable legal authority held by an occupying power, but the legal norm
recognizing the place of laws of humanity and dictates of public conscience
alongside the (non-conflicting) terms of the treaty. 129 By shifting the
interaction - the question of what law the parties sought to reach agreement
on - the interpretation and internalization of the norm became much
broader, focusing on the process for legal interpretation rather than the
primary law that would directly recognize authority in occupiers. 130

127. Id. at n.l. This component of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, known as the Martens clause after the Russian diplomat
who recommended it, may do no more than to extend to those engaging in combat as francstireurs the protections recognized for other lawful combatants, if it goes even that far. See,
e.g., id. at 187-216 (arguing that custom did not permit attacks on the occupying force and
would not have protected francs-tireurs, but Martens used the somewhat vague language of
the clause to appease smaller countries while not affecting the responsibilities of the great
Powers). Nevertheless, the reasoning allowed for under the Martens clause calls for the
application of recognizable but not fully enunciated rules over a variety of circumstances not
yet fully developed. Again, it may be of interest that the smaller states, such as Belgium, are
looking to the protection of individuals (under the droit des gens) as opposed to the rights of
states.
128. Id. at n.29 (citing Conference Intemationale de la Paix LaHaye 18 Mai-29 Juillet
1899, Troisieme Partie (1899) at 153) ("Demain comme aujourd'hui les droits du vainqueur,
loin d'etre illimites, seront restreints par les lois de la conscience universelle et pas un pays,
pas un general n'oserait les enfreindre, puisque ce serait se mettre au ban des nations
civilisees. ").
129. Indeed, Cassese references the speech made by Martens after Martens tabled his
proposal of the clause: "Il ... faut se rappeler que ces dispositions [on lawful combatants
and mass conscription (levee en masse)] n'ont pas pour objet de codifier tous les cas qui
pourraient se presenter." ("We must recall that the object of these clauses is not to codify
every eventuality that could present itself."). Id. at n.l8. Despite Cassese's (and Martens')
view that the clause was meant to deal only with these two aspects of guerilla warfare, the
defense of the limitations on the clause make the very point raised by the Belgian delegatethe smaller states could continue to look to custom and general principles in response to the
overwhelming force of an occupying power.
130. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 375, 408, (dissenting opinion) (arguing that "the basic function of the Clause was to
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Although the 1899 Hague Convention called only for state liability for
compensation and not for criminal sanctions, the normative effect of the
Martens Clause's adoption allowed for a second iteration in the 1907 Hague
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and the
adoption of language at that point reflected a belief in the legality of
reliance as legally cognizable the public conscience and laws of humanity
moving forward in interpreting lawful conduct in times of armed conflict
between states. 131
D. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles
Following World War I, the most powerful nations in Europe
convened again to continue their discussions on how to resolve the issue of
concurrent powers and the allocation of prosecutorial power to the
international level. The transnational legal process that led to the
recognition of liability for violations of the laws of war in the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were coupled with questions of individual
culpability that came to the forefront during the Peace Conference of 1919.
The Commission of Responsibility of Authors for the War (the
Commission of Responsibilities, or the Commission) was tasked by the
Peace Conference to deal with questions of war crimes and international
accountability. 132 The Commission investigated the causes of war and
evaluated the ability of the several Allied powers to create a tribunal
appropriate to try offenders against the laws and customs of war. 133 It
distinguished this responsibility from that of the development of an
put beyond challenge the existence of principles of international law which residually
served, with current effect, to govern military conduct by reference to the 'principles of
humanity and ... the dictates of public conscience."') One should also note Martens' own
investment in, and his reminder to his colleagues regarding, the Conference's successfully
codifying some of the standards the Brussels Declaration had failed to codify. Czar
Alexander II had convened the 1874 Brussels Conference, and Czar Nicholas II convened
the 1899 Hague Conference, such that Martens reminded his colleagues that the failure of
the diplomatic community to agree on specific treaty rules for a second time would show the
military that diplomats could not fashion rules regarding the laws and customs of war,
leaving the military free to interpret the laws of warfare as they p\eased. See Cassese, supra
note 124, at 195.
131. Although Cassese argues that Martens' references in the clause may have been a
political expedient to appease the Belgians, Martens' belief in a limited natural law depiction
of human rights foreshadows the "objective law" view of Scelle: "These [human] rights flow
from the natnre and from the conditions of humanity and so cannot be created by legislation.
They exist in themselves." [Ces droits [de l'homme] decoulent de la natnre et des conditions
de l'humanite et ne peuvent done pas etre crees par la legislation. Ils existent par euxmemes.] Cassese, supra note 124, n. 45 (citing Martens, Traite de droit international, vol. I,
at 14 (1883-87)).
132. See Paris Peace Conference, Violations of the Laws and Customs of War: Reports of
Majority and Dissenting Reports American and Japanese Members of the Commission of
Responsibilities, 1-2 (1919). Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. III, 203-05 (1919).
133. Jd.
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international tribunal and truth-gathering organization, a job believed to be
better left to historians.
As noted previously, the 1907 Hague Convention restated and
reiterated the 1899 Martens Clause to call for a broader reading of positive
law as expressed through principles and the laws of humanity, beyond the
written word articulated in the codification completed during the 1899 and
1907 Conferences. The continued interaction among institutional actors,
such as other delegates who accepted the terminology of and purpose
behind the Martens Clause, allowed for its repeated use through the 1919
Peace Conference and its internalization by representatives of States
Parties. 134 It was of particular import to the Commission that during the
1907 negotiations, the German representative had taken a stance on the
importance of international principles as guiding state actions. Rather than
focus on formulating specific language for each eventuality, that
representative had stated that certain acts would not be taken by the German
Navy, not because of the codification undertaken by the Conference, but
because such actions would be contrary to the unwritten law ofhumanity. 135
That the German Navy used submarine mines during World War 1the very act that the German representative had stated need not be
specifically forbidden by treaty 136-was not lost to the participants in the
1919 Peace Conference. The Commission appeared to take particular
offense that "those Powers . . . a short time before had on two occasions at
The Hague protested their reverence for right and their respect for the
principles of humanity," had fully reversed position and committed those
very acts only a decade later. 137
The understanding that, on some level, nations had accepted the idea
of a transnational unwritten law of humanity allowed the commission to
decide that "the public conscience insists upon a sanction which will put
clearly in the light that it is not permitted cynically to profess a disdain for
the most sacred laws and the most formal undertakings." 138 However strong
the desire was for an international sanction against Germany's war crime,

134. Id.
135. See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on
Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (Mar. 29,
1919), 14 AM. J. INT'L. L. 95, 117-18 (1920) [hereinafter Commission Report]; see also id. n.
65 (citing the declaration of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein to the Hague Conference of
1907: "Military operations are not governed solely by stipulations of international law. There
are other factors. Conscience, good sense, and the sense of duty imposed by the principles of
humanity will be the surest guides for the conduct of sailors, and will constitute the most
effective guarantee against abuses. The officers of the German Navy, I loudly proclaim it,
will always fulfill in the strictest fashion the duties which emanate from the unwritten law of
humanity and civilization.").
136. See id.
137. Id. at 117-118.
138. Id. at 118.
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the Commission was frustrated by the fact that the Hague Conventions had
not set up a mechanism for the investigation and prosecution of a
premeditated war of aggression. 139 Instead, the Commission was only able
to recommend, based on the gravity of the outrages upon the principles of
the law of nations and upon international good faith, that certain acts "be
the subject of a formal condemnation by the Conference," and that "for the
future penal sanctions should be provided for such grave outrages against
the elementary principles ofinternationallaw." 140
Due to past interactions and the development of standards over the
course of the previous half-century, the Commission's treatment of laws
and customs of war and the laws of humanity could be, and was, much
broader than its treatment of aggressive war. The Commission concluded
that "[a]ll persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their
position may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of
States, who have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of
war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution." 141 This
marked a remarkable shift since a decade ago, there was reluctance in
putting into place international tribunals to prosecute war crimes.
The Commission went even further, not limiting its recommendations
with regard to international criminal prosecution to only those actually
committing war crimes. In addition to the parties culpable for breaches of
the laws of humanity, the Commission report added responsibility for those
who failed to prevent violations of the laws or customs of war, which
included some of the highest ranking military leaders and officials of the
German government. 142
During the course of the war, politicians and lawyers had called for
the punishment of not just the immediate perpetrators but also of those with
some degree of command responsibility. 143 However, at the war's end, all
139. Id. (stating that a suddenly declared war under false pretexts
is conduct which the public conscience reproves and which history will
condemn, but by reason of the purely optional character of the institutions at
The Hague for the maintenance of peace (International Commission of
Inquiry, Mediation and Arbitration) a war of aggression may not be
considered as an act directly contrary to positive law, or one which can be
successfully brought before a tribunal such as the Commission is authorized to
consider under its terms of reference.).
140. Id. at 120. Again, the Commission considers the gravity of the outrages on the
principles of international law or the law of nations as creating sufficient reason for future
penal action.
141. Id. at 117.
142. Id. at 121.
143. See Gamer, supra note 119, at 88-89 (citing 39 REVUE PENITENTIAIRE 457 (1915)
(according to Professor Weiss of the Law Faculty of the University of Paris, "I think ... that
not only the direct immediate offenders should be held responsible, but tl!at we must go to
the top; we must pass over the heads of the primary offenders, to the chiefs, to those of
whom the soldiers and officers have been only the servants and valets.")).
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parties were waiting to see whether the international community would
maintain the will to actually prosecute that broad range of individuals. 144
Some noted that Kaiser William II had instigated the war and believed his
stepping down and trial would be good for international justice and
morality, and would also benefit the German people in terms of having an
international reckoning for a key player in starting the war. 145 The
Commission held firm in its recommendation for a broad reach of potential
war crimes culpability, encouraging its application for the first time to
political leaders as wel1. 146
Despite the strength of the Commission report, there were some
doubts as to the wisdom of allowing international prosecution of war
criminals. Even among the Allies in favor of the Commission report, some
nationals questioned the logic of this submissive sovereignty - an
international court may be prone to engage in overreach in making those
decisions relating to imprisonment that were typically within the purview of
the sovereign. 147 Respected scholars were incredulous at the idea a
sovereign would allow international tribunals of third states or enemy states
to judge deeds typically left to the national courts. 148

144. See, e.g., James F. Willis, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND
DIPLOMACY OF PUNISIDNG WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 51 (Greenwood Press
1982)(citing France's statement to Germany of October 4, 1918: "Conduct which is equally
contrary to international law and the fundamental principles of all human civilization will
not go unpunished .... The authors and directors of these crimes will be held responsible
morally, judicially, and financially. They will seek in vain to escape the inexorable expiation
which awaits them.").
145. See, e.g., id. at 38 (noting former U.S. President Howard Taft stating, "William was
behind it all the time," and former U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain Joseph Hodges Choate
hoping the war would "put an end to this Imperial Dynasty and give the people of Germany
a chance.").
146. See Commission Report, supra note 135, at 116-17.
147. See HARRY D. GOULD, THE LEGACY OF PUNISHMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16
(Palgrave MacMillan ed. 2010) (discussing sovereignty as the contrapositive to punishment
in defining sovereignty as that which exists above punishment) ..
148. See Garner, supra note 119, at 71, n.2, (quoting a speech from Professor Louis
Renault, 1907 Nobel Peace Laureate and participant for France in the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Peace Conferences, in which Renault was asked about the enforceability of a provision in a
treaty of peace requiring delivery of principal offenders against the laws of war to triers
outside ofthe defendants' nations:
I do not see how a government, even if conquered, could consent to such a
clause; it would be the abdication of all its dignity; moreover, almost always,
it is upon superior order that infractions on the law of nations have been
committed. I have found the proposal excessive, though I understand the
sentiment that inspired it. I cite it because it shows well to what point men,
animated by justice and shocked by what has taken place, desire that the
monstrosities of which French and Belgians have been victims should not go
unpunished.
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Despite these concerns, the Commission suggested two mechanisms
of prosecution. First, each belligerent would have the power to set up, or
use from its current system, an appropriate domestic trial venue that would
149
enforce international norms. Second, the Peace Conference could create a
high tribunal to try special cases, including (1) defendants belonging to
enemy countries that have committed outrages against civilians and soldiers
of several Allied nations; (2) persons in authority whose orders affected the
conduct of operations against several of the Allied armies; (3) all civil or
military authorities of enemy countries, regardless of rank, who ordered or
failed to prevent violations of the laws or customs of war/ 50 and (4) such
other persons who were most appropriately tried before an international
tribunal. 151 Of note, the high tribunal would also have preference over
national courts for the same offence, have the ability to transfer cases to
national courts for inquiry or for trial and judgment, and would allow for
prosecutorial discretion in case selection. 152
The Commission stated that the tribunal would apply "the principles
of the law of nations as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of public
conscience." 153 This language drawn from the Martens Clause would set
sufficient parameters to allow for the trial of war criminals. The tribunal
would "have the power to sentence [the guilty party] to such punishment or
25 REV. GEN. DE DROIT INT. PUB. 25). See also Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past
Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L. J. 2619,
2638-39 (1991):
Violations of human rights belong with crimes such as terrorism, narcoticstrafficking, and destabilizing democratic governments, in a category of deeds
which may, because of their magnitude, exceed the capacity of national courts
to handle internally.... But if the establishment of international courts seems
impossible, intermediate solutions could be implemented, such as the
internationalization of jurisdiction, and the refusal of foreign courts to
recognize amnesties, pardons, or special statutes of limitations for these kinds
of crimes.
149. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 121 (stating that each belligerent had the
right to form "an appropriate tribunal, military or civil, for the trial of such cases ... [which]
would be able to try the incriminated persons according to their own procedure, and much
complication and consequent delay would be avoided which would arise if all such cases
were to be brought before a single tribunal"). Again, this follows the recommendation and
model law of the 1880 Manual of the Laws of War on Land, supra note 81.
150. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 121 (authorizing trial of "all authorities,
civil or military, belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been,
without distinction of rank, including the heads of states, who ordered, or, with knowledge
thereof and with power to intervene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to
prevent, putting an end to or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war).
151. Id. at121-22.
152. Id. at 122. For example, the Commission plan states "the duty of selecting the cases
for trial before the tribunal and of directing and conducting prosecutions before it shall be
imposed upon a Prosecuting Commission of five members ...."
153. Id.
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punishments as may be imposed for such an offence or offences by any
court in any country represented on the tribunal or in the country of the
convicted person." 154 Looking at the list of crimes reported by the
Commission, the crimes are neither divided between war crimes and crimes
against humanity, nor are they systematically compiled. 155 Instead, the list is
illustrative of "diverse" and "painful" crimes, with additions "daily and
continually being made." 156 None of the European powers serving on the
Commission sought to challenge this fairly expansive power. The Martens
Clause had matured into settled law for the states that had participated in
the conferences leading to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. 157
E. Challenges to the 1919 Commission Report

In its challenges to the Commission Report, the US delegates raised a
number of issues deriving from a claimed distinction between legal and
moral obligations: the United States noted that "[t]he laws and customs of
war are a standard certain, to be found in books of authority and in the
practice of nations," while the "laws and principles of humanity vary with
the individual," preventing them from being considered in a court ofjustice,
particularly in the administration of criminallaw. 158 Rather than vindicating

154. Id.
155. Sandoz, supra note 108, at 668-69 (arguing that the list, while "somewhat interesting
historically, . . . cannot be viewed as the result of a serious and systematic work of
scholarship carried out to show established doctrine or state practice.").
156. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 113-115.
157. Although only ten ofthe fifteen signatories to the 1907 Hague Convention served on
the Commission on Responsibilities, eight of the ten- all but the United States and Japanrecognized the Commission's Majority Report without reservation.
158. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 134 (the United States representatives here
distinguish between responsibilities of a legal nature and those of a moral nature). See also
id. at 128. But see id. at 136 (arguing to the political question of sovereignty and head of
state immunity); id at 139-140 (distinguishing to the submission of a non-binding
commission of inquiry for aggressive war, to the extent anybody can investigate and
distinguish between an aggressive and defensive posture, and to note that such a body would
be responding to a moral and not legal question); cf id. at 146 (noting that tribunals to hear
war crimes must consider only war crimes over which the individual states already have
jurisdiction, as there was "no international statute or convention making a violation of the
laws and customs of war-not to speak of the laws or principles of humanity-an
international crime, affixing a punishment to it, and declaring the court which has
jurisdiction over the offence"); cf id. at 147 (noting the United States was "averse to the
creation of a new tribunal, of a new law, of a new penalty, which would be ex post facto in
nature, and thus contrary to the Constitution of the United States and in conflict with the law
and practice of civilized communities"); cf id. at 148 (noting that heads of state who violate
the laws and customs of war "are, as agents of the people, in whom the sovereignty of the
state resides, responsible to the people for the illegal acts which they may have committed,
and that they are not and that they should not be made responsible to any other
sovereignty"); cf id. at 129, 149 (stating that a head of state is morally, but not legally,

2013]

DEFYING GRAVITY

463

rights that exist according to the laws or principles of humanity-- a. term
negotiated, adopted, and utilized within a European context-- the United
States looked to apply the written laws of the parties regarding their own
courts applying penal laws to enemy belligerents. 159
The Japanese delegates similarly questioned whether international
law recognized a penal law for a belligerent presumed guilty of a crime
against the laws and customs of war, but appeared to challenge only the
inclusion of heads of state in those to be charged under high tribunal, and
the punishment for failure to "abstain[] from preventing or taking measures
to prevent, put[] an end to, or repress[] acts in violation of the laws and
customs ofwar." 160 Thus, while the European members of the Commission
on Responsibility looked to interpretations of law developed through and
internalized following the Brussels Declaration and Hague Conventions, the
United States and Japan did not recognize the developments as having
achieved the standard of law in a strict sense.
Eventually, following the first World War, the Allied governments
decided to limit their requests, "only want[ing] to make an example. To try
very large numbers would be to create great difficulties for the German
Government," which some states viewed as easier to work with than a
potential Bolshevist or Militarist Government. 161 State leaders shifted the
membership of the Inter-Allied Mixed Commission162 from legal experts to
those who would assist in the political expedient of selecting a number of
cases for Germany to conduct, "to uphold moral principles and treaty
rights." 163
While maintaining the commission structure, this signified the move
toward a political solution over a legal one, moving away from legal
concepts such as deterrence of, retribution against, and reparations from
individual perpetrators toward recognition of culpability and reparations by
the state. Thus, while states recognized the harm done by the parties
responsible to mankind, such that the authority of the Commission was circumscribed by its
mandate: to report on "facts as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed
by the forces of the German Empire and its allies ...").
159. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 135.
160. M. Adatci & S. Tachi, Reservations by the Japanese Delegation (Apr. 4, 1919), 14
AM. J.INT'L L. 70, 152 (1920).
.
161. Willis, supra note 144, at ll7 (referencing the English view that the Allies should
seek the surrender of "the most important and notorious offenders and let the rest go," and
the French view to commence with "a few symbolic persons."). While even a shortened list
of Germans sought by the Allies for trial had 1,580 alleged offenders on it, compromise
among the Allies brought the list down to 890. Eventually, the Allies allowed Germany to
try an almost negligible number of alleged war criminals.
162. The Inter-Allied Mixed Commission was formed to "collect, publish and
communicate to Germany details of the accusations made against each of the responsible
persons" for war crimes during World War I. See Allied Note to President of German
Delegation Respecting War Criminals, May 7, 1920, in 16 (4) Supp. AM. J. INT'L L. 195, 196
(1922).
163. Willis, supra note 144, at 124.
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defeated during the war and could specify the criminal nature of that harm
such that a majority of those states could agree to the propriety of criminal
sanctions, political and economic expediency allowed the states to, in large
part, step away from criminal process in response to war crimes and crimes
against humanity.
F. The Nuremberg Charter ofthe International Military Tribunal

Thus far, we have seen that Europe and increasingly, other world
powers develop penalties for crimes engaged in during a conflict use war
and legal issues raised through the conflict to crystallize legal questions
regarding rights and responsibilities of parties to the conflict. Following the
first World War, most of the great Powers of Europe had recognized a legal
standard, but were unwilling or unable to enforce that standard.
The twentieth-century saw the rise of a voluntary-positivist view of
international law - law as an expression of the will of the state, based in a
specific, legally cognizable source on which the state representative might
rely. 164 In applying international law, the international community had to
decide what weight to give arguments stating that a law reached customary
status, or reflected a general principle. 165 This happens whether the
international community can interpret international law through a
designated international body, or allows for interpretation of the law to

164. While we celiainly saw as much in the United States response to crimes against
humanity in the Commission report following World War I, we also see the International
Couli of Justice struggle with sources of law. See, e.g., Competence of the General
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J.
5 (Mar. 3, 1950) (dissenting opinion ofiCJ Judge Alvarez):
The common view that international law must be created solely by States is,
therefore, not valid to-day-nor indeed has it ever been .... [New International
Law's] point of depaliure is that, to-day, States are increasingly
interdependent: and that consequently they do not form a simple community,
as formerly, but rather a veritable international and organized society. This
society in nowise abolishes the independence and the sovereignty of the
States, nor their legal equality (Aliicle 2 paragraph 1, of the Chalier); but it
limits this sovereignty, and the rights which flow therefrom, in view of the
general interests of this society.
In accordance with the Preamble to the Chalier, the new organization- and
consequently, the new law which flows therefrom- must have the following
ends in view: to maintain peace, to consider the general interest, to safeguard
fundamental human rights, to promote co-operation between States, to bring
their interests into harmony, to promote economic, social, intellectual and
humanitarian progress. The old individualistic law had none of these purposes;
it took account only of the interests of the individual [state] considered in
isolation.
!d. at 13-14.
165. !d.

2013]

DEFYING GRAVITY

465

devolve back to the states.
The bases of international law were recognized and formalized by the
international community in the Charter of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, to be later restated in the Statute of the International
Court of Justice. 166 Independent sources of international law include treaty
law, customary international law, and general principles of law, with
decisions of jurists and writings of scholars take on a supportive role in
understanding the law. 167 These sources are a minimum - that is, courts
may look to these sources and give them weight, notwithstanding
arguments made by a party before the court that a particular source is not
properly law. 168 The dynamics underpinning all of these sources of law
were hotly debated at the end of World War II, 169 when the question of what
international criminal justice mechanisms were desirable, available, and
enforceable loomed large.
The victorious states, as the United Nations, 170 prepared for the
prosecution of Nazi war criminals at the end of World War II. The US
delegate to the United Nations War Crimes Commission, Herbert Pell,
sought retribution for atrocities committed against people on racial or
religious grounds based on the application of the "laws of humanity" and
suggested crimes committed against persons based on their race or religion
constituted "crimes against humanity." 171
British prosecutor Hartley Shawcross noted that crimes against
humanity were different in kind from the crime against peace and the
ordinary war crime. To a certain extent, the crime was carried out as part of
the Nazi Party's total war policy, thereby raising international issues of

166. U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993
(1945) [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
167. Id. art. 3 8(1 ).
168. See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1994
I.C.J. 112 (July 1994) (where the International Court of Justice finds the existence of a treaty
notwithstanding denial of intent to treat meeting minutes as binding by party seeking to
challenge I.C.J. jurisdiction.).
169. Formulation of the Nilrnberg Principles, 2 YB. Int'l. L. Comm'n. 181,182-88
(1950). Indeed, at a meeting of the International Law Commission in 1949, member Georges
Scelle proposed that the International Law Commission "also formulate the general
principles of international law underlying the Charter and the judgment [of the Niimberg
Court]," but the proposal was rejected. Jd. at 189.
170. The term "United Nations" in its current context was first used in a document
describing twenty-six nations united "in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism." See United
Nations, Declaration by United Nations (Jan. 1, 1942), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/
ha/cun/photo06.html; see also United Nations, History of the United Nations,
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/ (last visited May 17, 2013) (describing the United
Nations' history).
171. Michael R. Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945-46: A Documentary
History 186 (Bedford Books 1997).
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crimes against peace. 172 However, in addition to its impact on the
international community, its criminalization derived from "matters which
the criminal law of all countries would normally stigmatize as crimesmurder, extermination, enslavement, persecution on political, racial or
economic grounds." 173 Shawcross noted that the nations adhering to the
Nuremberg Charter "felt it proper and necessary and in the interest of
civilization to say that these things . . . were, when committed with the
intention of affecting the international community ... not mere matters of
domestic concern but crimes against the law of nations ...." 174
Again, we see the effects of a transnational legal process, albeit one in
which the victorious powers following a conflict also acted with power in
the domestic sphere as occupying forces. Notwithstanding that, there was
the interaction of states and peoples - both allies and enemies - during a
time of war and soon thereafter, trying to clarify the scope and nature of
international criminal justice. As a supranational or international
community, the rules that should have protected populations needed to be
interpreted in a way that was acceptable within a legal framework, both by
the prosecuting states and the citizens of states subject to trial; in doing so,
the states and international community internalized the notion that these
crimes were cognizable in the international sphere. By setting parameters
for punishment following a specific conflict, the United Nations recognized
an applicable international criminal system, and set about attempting to
codify it, internalizing it for the victorious states as well as for those
defeated during the war.
G. Development ofAtrocity Crime Regulation Since Nuremberg
In the years since Nuremberg, the scope of the jurisdiction of
international tribunals has expanded in some contexts and faltered in others.
This splintered approach reflects political pressures, financial constraints,
decisions made based on prosecutorial discretion, and a persistent
ambivalence toward international jurisdiction over atrocity crimes.
Notwithstanding the inconsistencies in the approach of the United Nations
bodies and member states responding to international criminal law issues,
the trend of non-governmental organizations, the UN system, and states has
been toward the development of standards and processes to enable the
prosecution of international crimes.
One of the initial agenda items of the nascent United Nations
organization was the codification of the Nuremberg Principles, undertaken

172. Id. at 188.
173. Id. at 188-89 (citing Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, 42 vols. 19:470-72
(Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, 1947)).
174. Id.

2013]

DEFYING GRAVITY

467

by the International Law Commission in a Draft Code of Offences against
the Peace and Security ofMankind. 175 The International Committee for the
Red Cross prepared a draft of re-articulated international humanitarian law,
which after diplomatic Conferences in Geneva became the 1949 Geneva
Conventions; some aspects of the Geneva Conventions clarified the need
for states to prosecute grave breaches of the Laws of Armed Conflict. 176
The early 1950s saw an advance toward the ICC, and a move toward
the end of impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity (including
genocide) was progressing well. The international community came to
accept that "[i]nternational law now protects individual citizens against
abuses of power by their governments [and] imposes individual liability on
government officials who commit grave war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity." 177 The General Assembly unanimously affirmed the
principles of the Nuremberg Charter, which many courts, international and
municipal, have understood as an authoritative declaration of customary
internationallaw. 178
During the Cold War, distrust and power imbalances prevented the
on-going codification and development of international criminal law, with
some exceptions, prior to the development of the ad hoc tribunals. 179
Despite this period where the growth of international criminal law slowed,
development of international criminal law has increased greatly with ad hoc
tribunals, the creation of the ICC, and the development of international

175. Formulation of the Principles Recognized in the Charter of the Ntirnberg Tribunal
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, G.A./Res./177(II) (Nov. 21, 1947), available at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/038/84/IMG/NR003884.pdf?
OpenElement:
[T]o entrust the formulation of the principles of international law recognized
in the Charter of the Ntirnberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal to
the International Law Commission, the members of which will, in accordance
with resolution 174 (II), be elected at the next session of the General
Assembly, and directs the Commission to (a) Formulate the principles of
international law recognized in the Charter of the Ntirnberg Tribunal and in
the judgment of the Tribunal, and (b) Prepare a draft code of offences against
the peace and security of mankind, indicating clearly the place to be accorded
on the principles mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) above.
I d.
176. Sandoz, supra note 108, at 673-75.
177. Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional
Moment, 43 HARv. INT'L L. J. 2, 13 (2002).
178. Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the "Grotian Moment": Accelerated Formation of
Customary International Law in Times ofFundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 449,
455 (2010).
179. See generally BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL CRlMINAL JUSTICE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Oxford 2003) (arguing that the Cold War period
represented a time during which nations emphasized geopolitical concerns over the
prosecution of war crimes); Frederic Megret, The Politics ofInternational Criminal Justice,
13(5) EUR. J. INT'LL.l261 (2002).
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criminal law claims in national jurisdictions.
The first half of the twentieth century had raised the possibility of
greater accountability for atrocities. Despite a lack of prosecutions, the
arguments raised in the recommendation of the 1919 Commission on the
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties 180 advanced legal standards. Twenty-two perpetrators prosecuted
at the IMT Nuremberg trial, as opposed to the trials of over 1,000 alleged
perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity pursued under
Control Council Law No. 10 by military tribunals in occupied Germany and
in liberated or Allied nations, 181 already reflected a growth in the possibility
of prosecutions of international crimes at international and domestic levels,
even where the domestic courts were under the authority of occupying
powers. The ICC and the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda allowed for a greater number of trials to occur, both in the courts
themselves and outside the international court context both in the
completion strategies' recognition of domestic courts and the expansion of
complementarity. 182
The question of the ICC's jurisdictional scope persists, with continued
confusion regarding complementarity and the question of whether the ICC
or national courts ought to try war crimes, atrocity crimes, and crimes
against humanity. The reliance on the national courts makes structural
sense, to the extent that the ICC recognizes the primacy of the national
courts 183 and is a reserve court, intended to take cases only when the
national courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute the case,

180. Again, but for the four areas of exceptional cases recommended for an international
or mixed tribunal, the Commission recognized the right of each belligerent to try
"incriminated persons" in the belligerent's custody in an appropriate military or civil tribunal
existing under, or set up pursuant to, national legislation, and according to the belligerent's
own procedure. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 121. Presumably the vast number of
trials would have taken place within a national jurisdiction.
181. Scharf, supra note 178, at 454; KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 34 (for the claim of over
17,000 prosecutions in East Germany for crimes during the Second World War, with 1,800
for capital offenses, citing C.F. Ruter, Door Nederland Gezochte .Oorlogsmisdadigers Allang
Berecht Door de DDR-Prof. Ruter Krijgt Toegang Tot Stasi-achieven, 49 FOLIA 1-2, 8-11
(1996)).
182. Indeed, the completion strategies for the ICTY, List of ICTY Completion Strategy
Reports, http://www.icty.org/sid/10016 (last visited May 17, 2013), and the ICTR,
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR Complete Strategies, http://www.unictr.
org/AboutiCTR/ICTRCompletionStrategy/tabid/118/Default.aspx (last visited May 17, 2013),
called for their prosecutors to transfer cases of mid-level and lower-level perpetrators to
national courts to allow the international courts to focus on the most responsible senior
leaders. This dual track calls for the expanded use of national courts to deal with admittedly
international issues.
183. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 1, 17, 53, 58 (referencing complementarity,
admissibility, and the issuance of a warrant of arrest when a case is within the jurisdiction of
the Court).
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notwithstanding the national court's obligation to prosecute. 184
Nevertheless, the Nuremberg Tribunal noted that individuals who commit a
crime under international law can be punished for violations of international
law. 185 The differential posture of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Rome
Statute serve to highlight the tension in this area of concurrent powers
between the international and national levels. Yet this tension is not new.
The International Law Commission clarified as early as 1950 that the
duties imposed on individuals by international law require no interposition
of internal law, and reiterated the principle in the 1954 Draft Code of
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 186 The responsibility
for compliance lies with the people, and the remedy for a breach should be
immediately available, without further action taken by their leaders or
government agents prior to the enforceability of the peoples' rights. Thus,
the United Nations and its members recognized a right existing in
individual persons, and prosecutable against individual perpetrators.
However, it may be difficult to vindicate a right that individuals
cannot pin down. In revisiting the language of the crimes against humanity
provision of the Nuremberg Charter, interaction and interpretation led to
fragmentation of an understanding of the crime's defmition. For example,
the 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind
specifically referenced (a non-exhaustive list of) crimes against humanity in
the context of whether such crimes must be in the context of a war. 187 The
1991 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
referenced the same material, but expanded it into "Systematic or Mass
Violations of Human Rights," and to conform to the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege, purported to make the list exhaustive. 188
Because the violation of human rights would need to be of an
extremely serious character, only systematic violation such as a constant
practice or a methodical plan or mass scale (based on the number of people
or the size of the entity affected) violations would fall within the 1991
Code. 189 The party violating the human right could be a public official, or
"private individuals with de facto power or organized in criminal gangs or
groups might also commit the kind of systemic or mass violations of human
rights covered by the article ...." 190 This response to systemic/mass scale

184. See id. pmbl. 'lj'1[4, 6, & art. 1; Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity, supra note
32, at 93-94.
185. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment, 1 Int'l Mil. Trib. 52
(1947); Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 18 (1996) [hereinafter Draft Code] (emphasis added).
186. 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 150 (1954).
187. Id.
188. See 2 Y.B. Int'l L.Comm'n 103-04 (1991).
189. Id. at 103.
190. Id. At 103-04.
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human rights abuse was framed quite differently from the crime against
humanity claims brought before the Nuremberg Tribunal. 191
The 1993 and 1994 International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia (hereinafter, the "ICTY") and for Rwanda (hereinafter, the
"ICTR"), respectively, split the difference in terms of their treatment of
crimes against humanity for jurisdictional purposes. The ICTY Statute
required that the perpetrator commit the crime against humanity during an
armed conflict, but expanded the definition of the crime to include "other
inhumane acts," such that the list no longer purports to be exhaustive. 192
The ICTR Statute, on the other hand, did not require that crimes against
humanity occur during armed conflict, but that the perpetrator must
"commit [the crime] as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious
grounds .... ,!93
The International Law Commission continued to develop and codify
the laws allowing for the prosecution of these international crimes, with
additional changes. The 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind requires that a crime against humanity be "committed
in a systematic manner or on a large scale and [be] instigated or directed by
a Government or by any organization or group." 194 The International Law
Commission commentary to the Draft Code claims to apply "the Charter of
the Nlirnberg Tribunal, as interpreted and applied by the Niirnberg Tribunal,
taking into account subsequent developments in international law since
Ni.irnberg." 195
Instead of relying on the standard requiring a massive human rights
violation to qualify as a crime against humanity, as indicated in the 1991
Code, the 1996 Code points out that the Nazi policy of terror was "certainly
carried out on a vast scale," in order to suggest that, if the crime is not
systemic, but is widespread, it can still qualify as a crime against
humanity. 196 This mirrors the type of standard and language used since the

191. But see Schabas, supra note 4, at 536 (noting that, with the end of the Cold War and
fall of the Berlin Wall, proposals for an international criminal court were strengthened by the
growing emphasis of the human rights movement on accountability for atrocity crimes).
192. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Fonner
Yugoslavia since 1991, Updated Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia http://www.icty.org/
x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_ sept09_ en.pdf (last visited May 17, 20 13).
193. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR): Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 61, http://www.unictr.org/Portals/O/English!
Legal/Statute/2010.pdf (last visited May 17, 2013).
194. Draft Code, supra note 185, at 47.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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time of the Lieber Code. 197 The requirement of group instigation or
direction of the 1996 Code was new, and was intended "to exclude the
situation in which an individual commits an inhumane act while acting on
his own initiative pursuant to his own plan ... [particularly as] it would be
extremely difficult for a single individual acting alone to commit the
inhumane acts as envisaged in article 18 [the Crimes Against Humanity
provision]." 198 These variances in treatment by the Draft Codes of 1991 and
1996 serve to illustrate the ongoing tension in defining what acts are grave
enough to qualify as crimes against humanity and, therefore, should qualify
for admissibility before the ICC.
The Rome Statute defines Crimes Against Humanity as "any of the
following acts [listing acts virtually identical to the 1996 Draft Code] when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack." 199 Not surprisingly,
when U.S. Senators Durbin, Leahy, and Feingold introduced the Crimes
Against Humanity Act of 2009, the Act tracked the language of the Rome
Statute. 200
The baseline for a crime against humanity, specifically its attack
requirement, appears to be higher than the standard set in the 1996 Draft
Code, and different than the standard for crimes against humanity in the
ICTY and ICTR Statutes. Thus, the standard appears to be narrower from
the International Law Commission recommendation, notwithstanding the
recognition by a majority of UN member states that the ICC has
jurisdiction, that the United Nations through the Security Council may refer
matters to the ICC under Security Council authority to maintain
international peace and security,201 and that the right to protection from
these harms belongs to individuals under international law, not to citizens

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art.7.
200. See Scheffer, supra note 14, at 25-28. Ambassador Scheffer noted that the Act
required the attack be systematic and widespread, while the Rome Statute allows for the
attack on a civilian population to be systematic or widespread - but, given that the Rome
Statute defmition describes an "attack directed against any civilian population" to mean "a
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in [the listing of
crimes against humanity] against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy to commit such attack ... ," the crime must be widespread
(multiple commission) and systematic (pursuant to a policy), as formulated by the Rome
Statute Elements of Crimes. Id. at 27. Thus, while the wording of the crime appears to be
stricter than wording found anywhere else protecting against crimes against humanity, the
distinction made no difference.
201. See U.N. Charter, supra note 166, arts. 39, 41, 42. The authority of the Security
Council has been the basis for referrals to the ICC in the situations in Darfur, Sudan, and in
Libya, both non-parties to the Rome Statute at the time of referral (for a description of
situations before the ICC, see http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_ menus/icc/situations%20and%
20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx).
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of states through their state governments.
Assuming that the state has an obligation in the international sphere to
enforce the international understanding of crimes against humanity and a
responsibility to protect individuals within its borders from international
crimes, it is unclear in this fragmented model which definition would apply.
It could be the Draft Code as custom derived from state practice by the
International Law Commission, or the Rome Statute as Treaty and the
customary law adopted by over 120 states, or even the international
tribunals created by the Security Council that have been in existence for
nearly twenty years.
III. MOVING FORWARD: THE ROLE AND OBLIGATION OF
NATIONAL COURTS

Previous parts of this Article outlined some of the failures of the ICC
to live up to its potential and have traced the historical patterns that suggest
that the ICC will continue to narrow its jurisdictional scope. This part offers
potential solutions by considering how the current quandary surrounding
ICC complementarity and definitions of gravity can motivate national
courts to prosecute war crimes and engage in essential norm-setting
behavior that will resonate on both the national and international level.
The fact that ICC jurisdictional standards are still malleable creates
the opportunity for national leaders and agents, judges, and nongovernmental organizations to demand a decrease in barriers when seeking
a remedy, a greater number of trials, and the implementation of laws of the
ICC as the law of the state by seeking the adoption of terms broader than
that of the ICC statute as legislation within the state. While the perceived
lack of legitimacy of national courts may indeed be an issue, the national
courts' implementation of a lower threshold to entry than that of the ICC
may be the only manner to effect both the underlying purpose of the Court,
and to create a body of law from which other international criminal cases
can begin the process of interaction anew.
In addition, the international community has evolved in not only
recognizing a duty under international law to prosecute international crimes
as defined by international law, but also a responsibility to protect our
populations from the very harms caused by atrocity crimes. 202 In addition to
the obligation to give effect to criminal law recognized in the Rome Statute,
the United Nations has recognized that primary protection falls to the state
with secondary responsibility exercisable by the international community
through the UN Security Council. 203 This secondary right in the

202. See Charity, supra note 28, at 90-109 (detailing the development and standards
under the Responsibility to Protect).
203. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 97, 'lf'lf 138-39.
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international community to invest in state security even against national
will is also exercisable through the Security Council, which can refer
matters to the ICC, and delay the matter's consideration in the interest of
international peace and security. 204
In the meantime, the progressive narrowing of the ICC jurisdiction
has the potential to wreak immediate and problematic effects. For example,
while the conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa may continue for
years to come/05 actions surrounding the ICC have also given some
evidence of compliance pull in the application of amnesty laws in
U ganda?06 In communications with the ICC, Uganda was able to pass an
amnesty law for the largest portion of those involved in regional conflict,
while retaining the ICC as a reserve court?07 If that decision does not work
to Uganda's benefit, the compliance pull for such an act will decrease, and
the Court will not establish a norm in support of similar negotiations?08 In

204. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 14 & 16.
205. See, e.g., Jon Lunn, The African Great Lakes Region: An End to Conflict?, HousE
OF COMMONS (Research Paper 06/51), at 4 (2006), available at http://www.stabilisationunit.
gov.uk/stabilisation-and-conflict-resources/geographic/doc_ details/328-the-african-great-lakesregion-an-end-to-conflict.html:
The conflicts of the last decade across the African Great Lakes region must be
understood in the context of longer-term dynamics of ethnic conflict and state
formation. In doing so, it is particularly important to study patterns ofintervention in
each other's affairs by the states of the region and the role of natural resources in
fuelling conflict. Three factors have been identified by analysts as key contributors
to conflict in the region: ethnicity, state failure and greed. Peace-building strategies
have increasingly sought to address both political and economic issues and to
incorporate regional and international dimensions.
Even as political solutions move forward, it remains imperative to support the legal
legitimacy of those solutions, as noted recently by Raphael Wakenge, Coordinator of the
Congolese Initiative for Justice and Peace (ICJP):
We need a new approach, a peace process based on the principles of justice.
Past peace deals have often closed their eyes toward impunity, allowing war
criminals to be integrated into the army, police and security services. This has
undermined the legitimacy of the peace process and the reputation of the
security services, including the judiciary.
quoted in Richard Lee, Southern Africa: DRC Peace Deal Is Just the Start, OPEN SOCIETY
INITIATIVE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA (Feb. 26, 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/
20 1302260686.html.
206. That is, there appears to be some quality in the law that may induce, but not
necessarily compel, adherence (compliance) without necessarily reflecting obedience or
recognition of a legal requirement in and of itself. For a more in depth discussion of theories
of legitimacy and compliance pull, see Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter,
International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (2002).
207. See Uganda: Amnesty Act Without Amnesty, ALLAFRICA (June 3, 2012),
http://allafrica.com/stories/20 120604050 1.html.
208. See KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 325 (noting that in addition to support for norm
creation through a transnational/supranational dialogue, the negotiations recognize different
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short, the crimes against humanity that may be occurring in the course of
this conflict will go unpunished, and the lack of criminal liability will only
embolden future perpetrators of atrocity crimes.
A. Decoupling International and National Mechanisms for the Prevention
ofHarms

As there is a duality of international and national interest in the
protection against atrocity crimes, there cannot be a clear demarcation
between responsibilities for the prevention of these international harms, as
the protection is one recognized by international law for the benefit of the
individual. However, the proposed complementarity requires a demarcation
between the opportunity for state jurisdiction and international jurisdiction
in the punishment of these crimes. Although both the international and
national communities have interests in the outcome and the protection of
persons subject to these crimes, the outcome should not be determinative on
the mechanisms used.
B. International Purposes vs. National Purposes

Looking at the question of the extent to which national courts served
an international purpose, on the eve of the British election in October 1918,
Lord Finlay, the Lord Chancellor, said to an Inter-Allied Parliamentary
Committee: "Britain had 'two aims in this war. One of them was the
punishment of those who could be proved guilty of outrages,' and 'the other
was reparation for the wrongs that had been done.' Prosecution of
'offenders would not be mere vengeance; it would be the vindication of
international morality. '"209
The question of control by the state apparatus of mechanisms to
prevent the international crimes described in the Rome Treaty goes to the
core of complementarity. As previously discussed, there exist numerous
reasons that a local trial under the authority of a state with an interest in the
outcome of the case would be preferable to an international trial. Only when
the state exercising primary jurisdiction proves unable or unwilling to
engage in genuine investigations or trials would the international tribunal
levels of criminality and gravity in the International Criminal Law sphere, and allow Uganda
a voice in managing some of the lower level perpetrators). In addition to support for norm
creation through a transnational/supranational dialogue, the negotiations recognize different
levels of criminality and gravity in the International Criminal Law sphere, and allows
Uganda a voice in managing some of the lower level perpetrators. See also Ewald, supra
note 43, at 396; Baylis, supra note 31, at 44 (arguing that the adoption of the Rome Statute
in certain cases in the Democratic Republic of Congo "is not an isolated importation of
international law by the domestic system ... [but is part of the] multiple, overlapping
international-national interactions aimed at the more far-reaching goal of promoting postconflict justice by rebuilding the national justice system.").
209. See Willis, supra note 144, at 53.
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consider the admissibility of the case for international adjudication.
In attempting to prevent international harms, the state, as an entity in
itself with responsibilities to its constituents, and as a member of the
international community with responsibilities to the constituents of that
community, may have different resources, limitations, and strengths than
those available to an entity such as the ICC. The state-level apparatus will
more likely have a clearly differentiated system of a judiciary, legislature,
and executive.
All aspects of the state may have an interest in the outcome: some in
responding to constituent concerns for vindication (perhaps as indicative of
justice - i.e., the justice system will vindicate the rights of various classes
of people), some in response to stability (either through prevention of
escalation, or through maintenance of power structures that support the
status quo within the state, or minimize individual needs or desires of
various parties within the state), and some in application of their own
authorities within the state (responsive executive desirous of recognition to
a problem that a court cannot respond to with adequate alacrity)? 10 Some
have argued that the international community attempts to replicate the
governmental structures such that nothing immunizes the ICC from the
concerns raised within a state structure.211

210. The writings of Georges Scelle on the penneability of the do maine reservti responds
to this. A counterargument to state access to protection for those threatened by atrocities is
now, and has always been, the concept of a domaine reserve - the space in which the state
can distance itself from the encroachment of the international community. When the
international community comes together and relinquishes authorities previously within the
power of individual states to accomplish an international or transnational aim, the
community creates a supranational system. In order for the system to function, there must be
an agreement that the participants will follow the rule oflaw as expressed by the community.
The government of a state must often represent the state in its international dealings, creating
a dual role: both representing the interests of the constituents of the state, and representing a
participant in the joint undertaking in a transnational sphere. Some international
undertakings allow for or, indeed, require the actions of entities within a state system. One
such example is the complementarity envisioned by the ICC Statute -while the international
community responds to issues of concern, it does so because the actions are violative of both
the international interest in the shared undertaking, as well as the constituents' individual
interests. Scelle argues against states, such as the United States, that has an overbroad
reading of the domaine reserve. See Scelle, supra note 88.
211. Scelle, supra note 88, at 358 ("Social functions must be fulfilled in international
collectives just as in national collectives, or the phenomenon of solidarity would rapidly
disaggregate and the social tie would founder." [il faut que les fonctions sociales soient
remplies dans les collectivites internationales comme dans les collectivites internes, sans
quoi le phenomene de solidarite desagregerait rapidement et le lien social pericliterait]).
Scelle gives examples of the various branches of a state government acting with an
international motive.
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C. Why National Courts Must Act

National courts were envisioned to be the primary actors in
prosecuting international atrocity crimes and enforcing the growing global
consensus that human rights norms must be protected and promoted.
Although they are not currently fulfilling this role, their importance in
establishing a strong framework of international criminal justice should not
be understated.
As discussed, the state is well-positioned to take on this role: the
preparation for the ICC planned around the concept of a reserve court; the
complementarity provisions recognize a much more robust and active
international community acting through national courts; and national courts
are in at least as good a position to express the will of the States Parties to
the ICC Statute as the ICC itself, until such time as the ICC has clarified its
interpretation of the interpretive issues surrounding the crimes within its
jurisdiction.
This is particularly true where there exists a gap between what the
ICC purports to do, and what the Statute requires the member states to do in
conjunction with the Court. The application of international criminal law
has been, to a certain extent, a gap-filling exercise - allowing for us to
recognize the imperfections in our protective processes, and to then better
articulate standards and processes to close the gaps. However, there are
times where the international community recognizes a gap that fails to
protect a class originally considered for protection by legal process. 212
Given the opportunity to protect that group, where parties do not reach an
agreement on how to best do so, or whether it is in fact possible to do so,
later arguments surrounding application and/or codification may lean
towards implementing the gap as part of the law as accepted by states so as
not to create new laws on which states have not agreed, or to expand on the
laws recognized by states.
The application of the gravity standard by the ICC is paradigmatic; in
raising what appears only an issue of complementarity, the ICC takes a risk
by allowing state practice to redefine how crimes are prosecuted (or note
prosecuted) within the ICC system. As noted, in the case of Bosco
Ntaganda, the ICC's controlling admissibility by refusing to hear cases
involving serious crimes unless the alleged perpetrator is among those most
responsible puts the onus on states parties to do the same - a cascading
effect of impunity that is precisely the opposite of what the Rome Statute
strived toward.

212. The development of the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect resolutions by the
U.N. General Assembly and Security Council is an example of recognition of the
international role in filling that gap-filling function. See generally, Charity, supra note 28, at
94.
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If national courts apply International Criminal Law terms broadly,
applying the terms as they understand the terms and wish them understood,
it will serve to bolster the ICC as an institution and norm-setting body,
since the ICC will then be in a better position to rely on the judgments made
at various levels of responsibility, and to recognize an international harm,
even when the ICC cannot or would not hear the case at an international
level.
CONCLUSION

Within the realm of atrocity crimes, no answer will serve as a panacea
for all humanity's ills. That does not mean that we should not continue
working toward as many remedies as possible. The ICC, by design, requires
input from various levels - from States Parties, to individuals seeking
investigations by sending communications to the Office of the Prosecutor,
to other entities seeking to resolve conflicts.
Where the individual members of the international community rely on
the Appellate Chamber to set rules for the gravity of a harm subject to
remedy, or allow for decisions to be relayed between the International Law
Commission, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the leaders of States,
individuals will have no voice in the international planning that would
protect so many from systematic or widespread violence. Only by
redoubling our efforts - through our legislatures, through our executive,
through our courts, and through ourselves - will the international
community be able to respond to our needs.

